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OVERVIEW
This essay considers whether international treaty law is a useful weapon
in the battle against the global sex trade. The introduction to this essay
surveys the extent of global sex trafficking. Part I of this essay discusses
the international legal conventions that address the issue of trafficking
in women. Part II of this essay assesses the effectiveness of these inter-
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national instruments and considers why they have failed to end the
world sex trade. In Part III, this essay describes the European and Inter-
American human rights systems, focusing upon substantive law in the
regional systems that might be relevant to the issue of prostitution. It
then briefly examines the procedures through which this substantive law
could be enforced.
This essay agrees with scholars who conclude that the substantive
terms of the international1 gender-based treaties prohibit trafficking in
women.2 This essay also maintains that the enforcement procedures in
the existing gender-based international treaties are inadequate.3 Under
these treaties, trafficking violates international law. An individual traf-
ficked woman, however, can neither bring a claim under the treaties
against her pimp or her purchaser, nor require a signatory nation to
bring a legal claim on her behalf. Further, despite these treaties, traffick-
ing in women continues on a massive scale.4 Consequently, the in-
adequate enforcement mechanisms of the treaties undercut their sub-
stantive prohibitions.
Despite the problems, this essay concludes that feminist lawyers
should work to promote enforcement of the principle that trafficking in
women is sex discrimination and a violation of human rights. These
principles and prohibitions should be enforced under both the regional
human rights treaties and the global legal conventions.
1. "International" refers here to those treaty instruments that are open for signature by
any member of the United Nations. By contrast, regional treaty instruments, such
as the European Convention on Human Rights, are generally open for signature
only to countries listed in the regional charter. See, e.g., European Convention for
the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Nov. 4, 1950, 5
Europ. T.S. 21 (entered into force Sept. 3, 1953) reprinted in COUNCIL OF EUROPa,
EUROP.AN CONVENTION ON HumAN RIGHTS: COLLECTED Thcrs 102 (1981)
[hereinafter European Convention].
2. See, e.g., Sherry Teachnor, The U.N. Convention on the Elimination of Al Forms of
Discrimination Against Women: An Ejfctive Tool to Combat Discrimination in the
2oth Century, 9 WHrrrR L. REV. 419 (1987). See also Andrew C. Byrnes, The
"Other" Human Rights Treaty Body: The Work of the Committee on the Elimination of
Discrimination Against Women, 14 YALE J. INT'L L 1 (1989); Noreen Burrows, The
.197g Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women,
32 NETHERLANDS L.J. 419 (1985).
3. See Laura Reanda, Prostitution as a Human Rights Question: Problems and Prospects of
United Nations Action, 13 HUM. RTs. Q. 202, 228 (1991).
4. Margot Hornblower, The Skin Trade, TME, June 21, 1993, at 45-46.
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INTRODUCTION
The Extent of the Problem
Many of the girls have broken teeth. They say they fell
downstairs. But there are so many of them that either this busi-
ness has the worst-maintained stairs in the world or these girls
are being punched.5
Don't ask me for love, Sir.
You're saying that you are paying for this
and for the sake ofyour money Iput up with your boozing
your mouth which smells offrothing alcohol.
Besides, you are not offering a lot of money. I need to buy clothes,
make-up
No, the money is not for some lover
it is for my old mother who lives in the country
for my brothers, who need something to wear
who need to go to school and have to eat
One does not live on air and even if one did
it would cost more for the poor.6
For five nights, Almira Ajanovic says, she was raped by Serb sol-
diers inside the temporary bordello they had set up in her home
village of Liplje, three men every night.
"They took a knife and cut my dress open, " the i8-year-old
woman saia recalling how it began. The men, paramilitary
troops with long beards in the style of Chetniks ... had stripped
to the buff, and two pinned her to the bed as the third raped her.
Then they switched places, each watching the others perform.
It continued for five nights, with different men each time,
until the sixth, when they heightened the humiliation by raping
Almira in front of her father. "That Chetnik said that he was
going to marry me. My father kept silent, " she recalled.7
5. Hornblower, supra note 4, at 45, 47 (quoting Francine Meert, head of Le Nid, a
Brussels aid group).
6. Moncho Huaga, untitled, (unpublished poem by a prostitute from Paraguay) (on
file with the authors).
7. Roy Gutman, Vctms Recount Nights of Terror at Makeshift Bordello, NawsDM, Aug.
23, 1992, at 37. The primary "customers" of these bordellos are Serbian soldiers.
Gutman, supra at 37.
MICHIGAN JOURNAL OF GENDER & LAW
A 15-year old Akha hill tribe girl forced into prostitution at
the age of 12, told Reuters a man came to her northern Thai
village and promised her a job in a Bangkok restaurant. The
man then took her to a brothel. '7 saw ladies dressed up nicely
and going out to work, and I cried and asked the ladies what
they were doing," she said. "7 realized I had been set up for
prostitution."
8
These quotations provide insight into the lives of trafficked
women. The quotes also show that men force women into prostitution
in many places and under many different circumstances. We live in a
world in which men buy and sell women's bodies for sex. On any given
day, international pimps market women and girls as slaves to Asian,
European, and American businessmen who fly hourly into South Korea
or Thailand for "sex vacations" organized by their local travel agencies. 9
Most recently, prostitution has become a new strategy of war, carried
out by Serbs in the "rape brothels" of the former Yugoslavia. 1°
"Exploitation of prostitution includes casual, brothel, military,
pornographic prostitution, and sex tourism, mail order bride markets,
and trafficking in women."1 The international traffic in women in-
cludes any "situation[] where women or girls cannot change the im-
mediate conditions of their existence; where, regardless of how they got
into those conditions, they cannot get out; and where they are subject
to sexual violence and exploitation."
12
8. Patricia Callahan, Little Progress in Ending Thai Child Prostitution, Reuters, Sept. 14,
1994, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Reuters File.
9. History and Statement of Purpose of the Coalition 1995-92, (The Coalition Against
Trafficking in Women, State College, PA) [hereinafter History and Statement of
Purpose]. See also Barbara Crossette, As Thai Sex Trade Increases, So Do Abuses, N.Y.
TuaEs, Oct. 6, 1986, at A10; Asian Governments Pander to American Tourists,
NWSDAY, June 7, 1985, at 14-16.
10. In these "brothels" the bodies of Bosnian women are being used as both payment
and bounty for Serbian soldiers. See, e.g., Catharine A. Macinnon, Turning Rape
into Pornography: Postmodern Genocide, Ms., July/Aug. 1993, at 24 [hereinafter
MacKinnon, Turning Rape into Pornography]; Catharine A. MacKinnon to Represent
Croatian, Muslim Wartime Rape Survivors, OFF OUR BACKS, Feb. 1993, at 3, 21;
Ivica Kostovic & Natalie Nenadic, Address at the University of Michigan Law
School (Mar. 4, 1993).
ii. Gayle Kirshenbaum, A Potential Landmark for Female Human Rights, Ms.,
Sept./Oct. 1991, at 13.
12. History and Statement of Purpose, supra note 9, at 3. As the above definition sug-
gests, this essay deals only with prostitution instigated by force, violence, or
coercion. Some scholars argue, however, that there is little difference between
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Many trafficked women are enslaved through violence, including
rape, gang rape, torture, forced sales, and kidnapping.' 3 Women are
sold and resold in every part of the world.' 4 In India, for example,
pimps purchase lower-caste Hindu women, often girls under the age of
sixteen, 15 to fill their brothels. When families refuse to sell these
women, pimps often kidnap the women and take them to different
provinces, where they are given new names and identides.' 6 In the
brothels, pimps condition women to accept prostitution through physi-
cal brutality and psychological torture. "Those who rebel against their
exploiters are starved, whipped, burnt with cigarette or beedi butts,
forced to drink intoxicating drinks, drugs or herbal concoctions, cut on
the face, branded or locked up."'
7
Other countries have similar problems. In China, changing
economic times have resulted in trafficking in women.18 For example,
in the village of Haotou in the southern Guangdong Province, Chinese
peasants "figured out an easy way to join the market economy." 19 The
peasants kidnapped young women and girls from other areas,
transported them back to Haotou, and forced them into prostitution.
coerced and so-called "voluntary" prostitution. Few women voluntarily choose
prostitution as their employment. Instead, women who are not kidnapped, bought,
or sold into prostitution are often forced to become prostitutes because they have
no other economic alternatives. See, e.g., RUTH ROSEN, THE LOST SISTERHOOD 147
(1983).
13. See, e.g., Julia L. Ernst, The Politics of Gender & Prostitution in India, Kenya and
Thailand (Dec. 12, 1992) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the authors).
14. Hornblower, supra note 4, at 45.
15. In many Asian countries, pimps prefer young girls, especially virgins, because
customers fear that older women carry HIV. Because of the fear of AIDS, girls are
often prostituted once and then, if they are lucky, discarded-penniless, often
addicted to drugs, and too humiliated to return to their families. See, e.g., Birgit
Schmidt am Bursch, Sex Touring, International Match-Making & International
Trafficking of Women under International Law, Panel Presentation at the Michigan
Journal of Gender & Law Symposium, Prostitution: From Academia to Activism (Oct.
31, 1992) (videotape on file with the Michigan Journal of Gender & Law).
16. See M. RrA RozAsuo, TRAFFCICING IN WOMEN AND CHILDREN IN INDIA (SExuAL
EXPLOITATION AND SALE) 48 (1988); BiswANAT- JoARDAR, PROSTIToUTON IN
HiSTomcAL AND MODERN PERsPEcrrVES (1984).
17. RoZAmo, supra note 16, at 78 (1988).
18. Communist party leaders dream of transforming China into another Singapore, a
successful market economy. Their plan is to jettison the economic aspects of
communism and replace them with the East Asian tradition of "market-Leninism,"
or free-market authoritarianism. Nicholas D. Kristof, China Sees "Market-Leninism'
as Way to Future, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 6, 1993, at Al, A5.
19. Kristof, supra note 18, at A5.
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"Many of the peasants turned their homes into brothels employing
more than ioo sex slaves." 20 In China, more than 240,000 people
engaging in prostitution were arrested last year;21 many times more sales
of women's bodies went unreported.
22
In Thailand and the Philippines, the massive industries marketing
sexual services have a much longer history of open sex trafficking. One
United Nations Economic and Social Council (UNESCO) study calcu-
lated that "two million Thai women work as prostitutes and that
800,000 are adolescents and children." 23 In the Philippines, prostitu-
tion, especially of children, is also rampant.
24
Prostitution occurs in the Middle East, but is carefully concealed.
At a recent conference on sex trafficking in Brussels, delegates reported
that impoverished parents in Bangladesh and India often sell their sons
and daughters to brokers from the United Arab Emirates and Oman.
25
These brokers transport the children to the Arab Middle East to work
in brothels or to be filmed for pornographic videos. 26 Similarly, in
Israel, the number of brothels in Tel Aviv has grown from 30 to i50 in
five years. 27 Recent Russian immigrants are the most popular sexual
commodities in Israel; advertisements for "entertainment services" boast
of "hot new Russians."
28
Recently, the prostitution of women and children has become a
strategy of war in the former Yugoslavia. "Rape brothels," most often
constructed by Serbian forces,29 are tools of genocide: "The world has
never seen sex used this consciously, this cynically, this elaborately, this
openly, this systematically, with this degree of technological and
psychological sophistication, as a means of destroying a whole
people."30 The Serbs have built approximately twenty concentration
20. Kristof, supra note 18, at A5.
21. Homblower, supra note 4, at 50.
22. Hornblower, supra note 4, at 45, 50.
23. Marlise Simons, The Sex Market: Scourge on the World's Children, N.Y. Timas, Apr.
9, 1993, at A3.
24. Michael S. Serrill, Defiling the Children, TWiE, June 21, 1993, at 53.
25. Simons, supra note 23, at 143.
26. Hornblower, supra note 4, at 50.
27. Hornblower, supra note 4, at 46.
28. Hornblower, supra note 4, at 54.
29. See, e.g., Gutman, supra, note 7, at 5; Roy Gutman, New Serb Horror Story: Rapes
by the Thousands, NEWSDAY, Aug. 9, 1992, at 4.
30. MacKinnon, Turning Rape into Pornography, supra note 10, at 24, 27.
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camps exclusively for women.31 In these camps, Croatian and Muslim
women and girls are raped, tortured, sometimes impregnated, and often
killed.32
Trafficking in women and young children is also pervasive in the
United States,33 despite laws against prostitution.34 Pimps prey on
young runaways. 35 Each year, approximately 6oo,ooo to I,OOO,OOO
children run away from home; it is estimated that a large percentage of
them become prostitutes.36 Adult women are lured into sexual slavery
when they respond to advertisements for work in "talent agencies," or
when they are offered starring roles in "entertainment shows."37 For
example, the Los Angeles Police Department and the Federal Bureau of
Investigation have documented over 300 cases per year of women forced
into prostitution when they responded to "talent agency" advertisements
for entertainment jobs in foreign countries.38 Law enforcement officials
ignore prostitution because they are bribed by pimps; city councils also
allow prostitution fronts to operate.39 "[Pimps'] profits are so fabulous
This is ethnic rape as an official policy of war not only a policy of the
pleasure of male power unleashed; not only a policy to defile, torture,
humiliate, degrade, and demoralize the other side; not only a policy of
men posturing to gain advantage and ground over other men. It is rape
under orders: not out of control, under control.... [This is] rape as a
policy of ethnic uniformity and ethnic conquest, annexation and expan-
sion, acquisition by one nation of others, colonization of women's bodies
as colonization of the culture they symbolize and embody as well as of
the territory they occupy. Croatian and Muslim women are raped to
make a Serbian state by making Serbian babies.
Catharine A. MacKinnon, Crimes of War, Crimes of Peace, in ON HuMAN RIGTrrs:
THE OxFoRD AMNEsw LEcTuREs 1993, at 89-90 (Stephen Shute & Susan Hurley
eds., 1993) [hereinafter MacKinnon, Crimes of War].
31. See generally MacKinnon, Turning Rape into Pornography, supra note 10.
32. See, e.g., Roy Gutman, Victims Recount Nights of Terror at Makeshift Bordello,
NEWSDAY, Aug. 23, 1992, at 27.
33. See, e.g., KATHLEEN BARRY, FEmALE SExuAL SLwvERY (1979).
34. Most states criminalize both prostitution and solicitation. See Raymond I. Parnas,
Legislative Reform of Prostitutions Laws: K~eping Commercial Sex out of Sight and out
of Mind 21 SANTA CLARA L Rav. 669, 675-76 (1981).
35. BARY, supra note 33, at 112.
36. Lan Cao, Note, Illegal Traffic in Women: A Civil RICO Proposal, 96 YALE LJ. 1297,
1304 n.35 (citing R TONG, WOMEN, SEX, AND THE LAW 60 (1984)).
37. Suzanne M. Shaughnessy, Fighting Sexual Exploitation of Women, NEw WoR
Ourn.ooK, Nov. 1983, at 26.
38. Shaughnessy) supra note 37, at 26.
39. Cao, supra note 36, at 1304-05 (quoting American Guild of Variety Artists: Hearings
Before the Permanent Subcomm. on Investigations of the Senate Comm. on Govt.
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that they are able to place such great temptation in front of law
enforcement officers that the first thing you know human frailties
prevail and your whole enforcement mechanism breaks down." 40
International gender-based 41 treaty law purports to outlaw traffick-
ing in women.42 Many nations have signed international legal instru-
ments recognizing that trafficking in women is a violation of human
rights.43 One such instrument commands each "state party"44 to "take
all appropriate measures, including legislation, to suppress all forms of
traffic in women and exploitation of prostitution of women." 45 Another
international convention forbids "prostitution and the accompanying
evil of the traffic in persons" on the grounds that trafficking in women
and children is "incompatible with the dignity and worth of the human
person."46 Another treaty mandates that "[no one shall be held in
Operations, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. 384 [hereinafter AGVA Hearings] (statement of
Sen. Mundt)). See also United States v. Tunnell, 667 F.2d 1182, 1184-85 (5th Cir.
1982) (operators of prostitution business bribed constable and justice of the peace).
40. Cao, supra note 36, at 1304-05 (quoting AGVA Hearings (statement of Sen.
Mundt)).
41. "Gender-based" refers to international treaties that concern the status of women. See
generally, Natalie Kaufman Hevener, International Law and the Status of Women: An
Analysis of International Legal Instruments Related to the Treatment of Women, 1
HAv. WoMEN's L.J. 131 (1978) [hereinafter Kaufman Hevener, Status of Women].
Natalie Kaufman Hevener first used this term in the course of developing three
analytic categories: "protective," "corrective," and "non-discriminatory." Kaufnan
Hevener, Status of Women, supra at 133. Kaufman Hevener uses these categories to
describe international legal instruments related to the treatment of women. Kauf-
man Hevener, Status of Women, supra at 133-34.
42. As of 1986, Kaufman Hevener had identified twenty-two international documents
concerning the status of women. See Natalie Kaufman Hevener, An Analysis of
Gender Based Treaty Law: Contemporary Developments in Historical Perspective, 8
HuM. RTs. Q. 70, 87-88 (1986) [hereinafter Kaufman Hevener, Gender Based
Treaty Law]. Many of these documents expressly prohibit trafficking in women.
Kaufman Hevener, Gender Based Treaty Law, supra at 74, 87-88.
43. Byrnes, supra note 2.
44. The nations that sign an international treaty are called "states parties." See M.N.
SHAw, INTERNArIONAL LAw 566 (3d ed. 1991). States parties consent to be bound
by the terms of the treaties that they sign. See Louis HENIUN ET AL., INTERNATION-
AL LAW: CASES AND MATERILuS 408 (2d ed. 1987).
45. Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women,
opened f r signature Mar. 1, 1980, 1249 U.N.T.S. 14, 17 (entered into force Sept.
3, 1981) [hereinafter CEDAW].
46. Convention for the Suppression of the Traffic in Persons and of the Exploitation of
the Prostitution of Others, Dec. 2, 1949, preamble, openedfrr signature Mar. 21,
1950, 96 U.N.T.S. 272 (entered into force July 25, 1951) [hereinafter 1949
Convention].
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slavery or servitude."
47
The existence of these conventions suggests that the international
community recognizes that prostitution is pervasive and harmful. In a
January 1983 report to UNESCO, a specially appointed "rapporteur"
concluded that prostitution is both common and a form of slavery from
which "[ilt is very difficult to escape." 48 Furthermore, in 1992, the
United Nations Committee which oversees the implementation of the
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against
Women (CEDAW) recognized that violence against women, as
manifested in the global sex trade, is a form of sex discrimination.
49
Also, the popular media in the United States and Europe frequently
document the extent of world trafficking in women and children.
50
Despite the recognition that prostitution is widespread, inter-
national treaty law which addresses global trafficking in women lacks
legal force. Like much of international law, legal instruments that ban
trafficking in women are difficult to enforce,5 1 because they are
qualified by reservations that eliminate the binding effects of these
treaties.52 Further, these treaties are left to be implemented by obscure
47. European Convention, supra note 1, art. 4, at 102-03.
48. Report of Mr. Jean Fernand-Laurent, Special Rapporteur on the Supression of Traffic in
Persons and the Exploitation of the Prostitution of Others, U.N. ESCOR, 1st Sess.,
Agenda Item 12, at 10-11, U.N. Doc. E11983/7 (1983). Slavery, of course, is
explicitly prohibited by the United Nations Charter. See Sandra Colliver, United
Nations Machineries on Women' Rights: How Might They Better Help Women Whose
Rights are Being Violated?, in NEw DIRECTIONS IN HUMAN RIGHTS 25 (Ellen L.
Lutz et al. eds., 1989); Margaret E. Galey, International Enforcement of Women's
Rights, 6 HuM. Rrs. Q 463 (1984) [hereinafter Galey, International Enforcement].
49. General Recommendation No. i: Violence Against Women, U.N. Committee on the
Elimination of Discrimination Against Women, 11th Sess., Agenda Item 7, at 1, 4,
U.N. Doc. CEDAW/C/1992/L.I1Add.15 (1992) (discussing the global sex trade
and other forms of discrimination against women).
50. Some of the popular media's coverage of this problem may be attributed to the
efforts of the Coalition Against Trafficking in Women. For example, major
American newspapers, such as the New York Times, Washington Post, and Los Angeles
Times, covered a recent conference in Brussels, sponsored in part by the Coalition.
Other artides concerning this issue have appeared in Time, Newsweek, and U.S.
News & World Report, among other publications, in the last two years. For a
bibliography of scholarly works concerning international law and the right to
nondiscrimination on the basis of sex, see generally Rebecca J. Cook, Bibliography:
The International Right to Nondiscrimination on the Basis of Sex, 14 YALE J. INT'L L.
161 (1989) [hereinafter Cook, Bibliography].
51. See generally Karen Engle, International Human Rights and Feminism: When Dis-
courses Meet, 13 MIcH. J. IN 'L L. 517, 543-75 (1992).
52. Rebecca J. Cook, Reservations to the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of
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committees in the United Nations' bureaucracy; which do little more
than collect and read reports concerning trafficking.53 Thus, for many
nations, the signing and ratification of these documents which facially
prohibit prostitution are often a sham. Signatories attempt to gain the
moral highground by loudly proclaiming that they have signed a docu-
ment condemning the buying and selling of women's bodies, when in
reality prostitution continues unchecked in their own countries. 54
As a result of these problems, many feminists have abandoned
these treaties. These feminists recognize that "because women are often
treated as 'second class' citizens in many countries of the world,
governmental efforts to promote their rights have [a low] priority, or
may be virtually nonexistent." 55
Yet, despite substantial enforcement problems, these treaties are
important legal tools for feminists because they declare that trafficking
in women is a violation of international law. The existence of such
declarations, even if the treaties are not enforced, represents a victory
for the international feminist movements which first imagined that
international law might be a mechanism for gender equality.
56
Ultimately, feminist lawyers should attempt to enforce the inter-
national legal prohibitions against trafficking in women despite the
existing enforcement problems. 57 Feminist lawyers and others should
Discrimination Against Women, 30 VA. J. INT'L L. 643 (1990) [hereinafter Cook,
Reservations to CEDAW].
53. Galey, International Enforcement, supra note 48, at 464-75; Malvina H. Gug-
genheim, The Implementation of Human Rights by the UN Commission on the Status
of Women: A Brief Comment, 12 TmX. INL LJ. 239 (1977).
54. MacKinnon, Crimes of War, supra note 30, at 97.
55. Galey, International Enforcement, supra note 48, at 463-64.
56. For a brief history of the passage of some of these documents, see Guggenheim,
supra note 53.
57. Deciding what it means to outlaw trafficking in women depends on how the terms
of international treaties directed toward prostitution are statutorily construed. When
a treaty provision reads "take all appropriate measures, including legislation, to
suppress all forms of traffic in women and exploitation of prostitution of women,"
CEDAW, supra note 45; 1245 U.N.T.S. at 17, does it mean that pimps should be
jailed, prostitutes should be jailed, consumers should be jailed, or all three should be
jailed? Alternatively, does this provision require national governments to establish
social welfare or job training programs so that prostitutes do not have to work as
prostitutes? The general language of this provision fails to specify what a signatory
nation should do to suppress trafficking. Further, the provision's commands to
"suppress all forms of traffic in women and exploitation of prostitution" could be
interpreted in utterly different ways by every state signatory.
The ambiguous nature of this provision indicates that interpreting the plain
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also examine the possibility of enforcing trafficking prohibitions in
regional human rights courts under relevant regional human rights
conventions.
I. INTERNATIONAL TREATY LAW PROHIBITIONS ON
TRAFFICKING IN WOMEN
The status and treatment of women has been the subject of at least
twenty-two different international legal instruments since 1945.58 Most
commentators agree that these instruments place the issue of women's
sexual exploitation in a human rights context. 59 Arguably, the gender-
based treaties also establish an "international right to nondiscrimination
on the basis of sex."
60
Two of these conventions, the Convention for the Suppression of
the Traffic in Persons and of the Exploitation of the Prostitution of
Others (The 1949 Convention), 61 and the Convention on the Elimina-
tion of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW) 62 deal
explicitly with prostitution.6 3 In reviewing the history of these Conven-
tions and considering the legal meaning of the provisions which
prohibit trafficking, we believe the history and preparatory work, or
language of international gender-based treaty law is not sufficient to determinte its
substantive meaning. We suggest, infia part I, that courts and scholars look to the
history and preparatory work of the treaties in order to construe these provisions.
Under our interpretation, such sources support a claim that trafficking in women
violates international law because trafficking is both sex discrimination and a
violation of equality principles contained in the gender-based international treaties
and in the United Nations Charter. Thus, the anti-traffickling provisions in the
gender-based international treaties should be enforced in light of principles of sex
equality.
58. See HENmN ET AL-, supra note 44, 991-93; Margaret K Bruce, Work of the United
Nations Relating to the Status of Women, 4 Hum. Rrs. J. 365-412 (1971); Kaufman
Hevener, Gender Based Treaty Law, supra note 42, at 75-88.
59. Myres S. McDougal et al., Human Rights for Women and World Public Order: The
Outlawing of Sex-Based Discrimination, 69 A w.acAN J. Ihr'x. L. 497 (1975).
60. Cook, Bibliography, supra note 50, at 161. See also Margaret E. Galey, Promoting
Nondiscrimination Against Women: The U.N. Commission on the Status of Women, 23
INr'L STUD. Q. 273 (1979) [hereinafter Galey, Promoting Nondiscrimination].
61. 1949 Convention, supra note 46, 96 U.N.T.S. at 272.
62. CEDAW, supra note 45, 1249 U.N.T.S. at 14.
63. See Kathleen Barry, The Prostitution of Sexuality: A Violation of Human Rights,
Keynote Address at the Michigan Journal of Gender & Law Symposium, Prostitution:
From Academia to Activism (Oct. 31, 1992) (videotape on file with the Michigan
Journal of Gender & Law).
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"legislative history," of these Conventions suggest the framers of the
treaties, to some extent, intended to promote sex equality. 64
A. The Early History
The history of United Nations action to eliminate trafficking in women
began on June 26, 1945 when the United Nations Charter was signed
by the delegates to the United Nations Conference on International
Organization.65 The United Nations Charter "was the first international
treaty to spell out the principle of equality in specific terms." 6 Among
other things, the United Nations Charter pledges member states to
promote and encourage "universal respect for, and observance of,
human rights and fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as
to race, sex, language, or religion."67 The preamble to the Charter re-
affirms "faith... in the dignity and worth of the human person, in the
equal rights of men and women ...."68
In 1946, the Commission on the Status of Women, 69 established
by the United Nations Economic and Social Council, held its first
session.70 After extensive debate, Commission members agreed on a
central motivating principle for their future work:
64. This essay assumes that trafficking in women is sex discrimination. For a
demonstration of this principle, see BARRY, supra note 33. For arguments in support
of an equality principle, see CATHAI.NE A. MAcKINNomN, TowwS A FEMINIST
THEORY OF THE STATE (1989).
65. U.N. CHARTER art. 3.
66. Laura Reanda, Human Rights and Women's Rights: The United Nations Approach, 3
HuM. RTs. Q., Spring 1981, at 11, 12 [hereinafter Reanda, Women's Rights].
67. U.N. CHARTER art. 55.
68. U.N. CATrER preamble, 5 2.
69. There is some conflict about whether the Commission on the Status of Women
started out as a sub-commission of the Commission on Human Rights. An official
United Nations source says that the Commission on the Status of Women was
established on June 21, 1946, the same day that the Commission on Human Rights
was elevated from "nuclear" form to full commission status. See United Nations
Action in the Field of Human Rights, U.N. Doc. STIHR/2/Rev. 3 (1988). But see
Reanda, Women's Rights, supra note 66, at 23; John P. Humphrey, The Memoirs of
John P. Humphrey, The First Director of the United Nations Division of Human
Rights, 5 HUM. RTs. Q. 387, 392 (1983) (stating that the Commission on the
Status of Women started as a sub-commission of the Commission on Human
Rights). For the sake of consistency and because the Commission on the Status of
Women has had full commission status since June of 1946 whatever its origins, we
will refer to is as a full commission throughout this article.
70. Reanda, Women's Rights, supra note 66, at 11, 18.
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Freedom and equality are essential to human develop-
ment and woman is as much a human being as man and,
therefore, entitled to share them with him;
In order to achieve this goal, the purpose of the Sub-Commis-
sion is to raise the status of women to equality with men in
all fields of human enterprise.
71
In accord with this statement of purpose, the Commission identified
the following long-term goals: (1) political equality, based on equal
participation in government; (2) civil equality, including equality in
marriage and equal rights to guardianship of children, nationality, and
property; (3) social and economic equality, including the prevention of
discrimination against women in social and economic status and the
abolition of prostitution and trafficking in women; and (4) equal educa-
tional opportunity.72 The Economic and Social Council73 subsequently
endorsed these goals and proposed a legislative program to achieve
them.74 The Council specifically planned to study the status of women
in national legislation and, based on its findings, draft and submit legal
instruments to the General Assembly for enactment. 75 In the following
years, the Commission and Council prepared a number of legal instru-
ments to address these goals.76 The Convention for the Suppression of
Traffic in Persons and of the Exploitation of the Prostitution of
Others77 (the 1949 Convention) was one of the first treaties drafted.
The General Assembly considered the Convention in 1949 and opened
71. Report of the Sub-Commission on the Status of Women to the Commission on Human
Rights, U.N. ESCOR, 2d Sess., Annex 4 at 237-38, U.N. Doc. E/HR/18/Rev. 1
(1946).
72. Reanda, Women's Rights, supra note 66, at 18. See also Colliver, supra note 48.
73. The Economic and Social Council oversees the work of the Human Rights Com-
mission, including the Commission on the Status of Women.
74. Reanda, Women's Rights, supra note 66, at 18.
75. Reanda, Women's Rights, supra note 66, at 19.
76. Between 1952 and 1962 the Commission sponsored the Convention on the Politi-
cal Rights of Women; the Convention on the Consent to Marriage, Minimum Age
for Marriage, and Registration of Marriages; and the Convention on the Nationality
of Married Women. See Galey, Promoting Nondiscrimination, supra note 60, at
276-78.
77. 1949 Convention, supra note 46, 96 U.N.T.S. at 272.
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the document for signature shortly thereafter.78
B. The 1949 Convention
Commentators generally agree that the 1949 Convention commits
signatories to three levels of obligations. 79 The first level of obligation
binds states to a general anti-trafficking principle. On the second level,
states agree to specific enforcement measures. On the third level, states
agree to use social welfare tools, in areas not addressed by criminal law
enforcement, to "rehabilitate" and otherwise support survivors of pros-
tituion.8 0
In its first few articles, the 1949 Convention obliges signatories to
work toward the "abolition" of sex trafficking.8' However, this "abol-
ition" language does not require the prohibition of prostitution. The
framers of the Convention viewed trafficked women as victims of pimps
and consumers.8 2 Thus, under the 1949 Convention, prostitution itself
is legal, and states parties agree that prostituted women will not be
punished or subjected to any special supervision or registration.8 3 Art-
icle 6 mandates that "[e]ach Party... take all the necessary measures to
repeal or abolish any existing law, regulation or administrative provision
by virtue of which persons who engage in ... prostitution are subject
either to special registration or to the possession of a special docu-
ment..... ."84 Instead of banning prostitution, the 1949 Convention
prohibits the accompanying pimping, procurement, brothel manage-
ment, and under most interpretations, consumption of prostitution. In
relevant part the Convention provides:
Article 1: The Parties to the present convention agree to
punish any person who, to gratify the passions of another:
1. Procures, entices or leads away, for purposes of prostitu-
tion, another person, even with the consent of that person;
2. Exploits the prostitution of another person, even with the
consent of that person.
78. 1949 Convention, supra note 46, 96 U.N.T.S. at 272.
79. Schmidt am Bursch, supra note 15.
80. Schmidt am Bursch, supra note 15.
81. Schmidt am Bursch, supra note 15.
82. 1949 Convention, supra note 46, art. 1, 96 U.N.T.S. at 274. See Reanda, Womens
Rights, supra note 66, at 20.
83. 1949 Convention, supra note 46, art. 6, 96 U.N.T.S. at 276.
84. 1949 Convention; supra note 46, art. 6, 96 U.N.T.S. at 276.
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Article 2: The Parties.. further agree to punish any person
who:
1. Keeps or manages, or knowingly finances or takes part in
the financing of a brothel;
2. Knowingly lets or rents a building or Other place or any
part thereof for the purpose of the prostitution of others.8 5
The 1949 Convention establishes the second level of states' obliga-
tions in Articles 8 through 15.86 States agree to participate in cooperative
administrative and enforcement activities with other signatories. The
measures specified in these articles include extradition of traffickers,
joint investigation, exchange of information regarding trafficking, and
recognition and enforcement of foreign convictions of traffickers.8 7
In Article 16, the 1949 Convention creates a third level of obliga-
tions which requires states to undertake general social measures, other
than those taken under the criminal law, to end sex trafficking. Under
this article, states must take action "for the prevention of prostitution
and for the rehabilitation and social adjustment of the victims of pros-
titution" under their "public and private educational, health, social,
economic and other related services." 88
The Commission on the Status of Women intended the 1949
Convention to be a comprehensive document.89 In particular, the 1949
Convention consolidated several earlier treaties addressing white slave
traffic, including the International Agreement for the Suppression of the
White Slave Traffic,90 the International Convention for the Suppression
of the Traffic in Women and Children,91 and the International Con-
vention for the Suppression of the Traffic in Women of Full Age.
92
These early treaties obligated national authorities to cooperate in ending
85. 1949 Convention, supra note 46, arts. 1-2, 96 U.N.T.S. at 274.
86. 1949 Convention, supra note 46, arts. 8-15, 96 U.N.T.S. at 276-80.
87. 1949 Convention, supra note 46, arts. 8-15, 96 U.N.T.S. at 276-80.
s8. 1949 Convention, supra note 46, art. 16, 96 U.N.T.S. at 280.
89. Reanda, Women's Rights, supra note 66, at 20.
9o. International Agreement for the Suppression of the White Slave Traffic, May 18,
1904, 92 U.N.T.S. 19 (entered into force June 21, 1951 as amended by the
Protocol of May 4, 1949).
91. International Convention for the Suppression of the Traffic in Women and
Children, Sept. 30, 1921, 53 U.N.T.S. 39. See Kaufman Hevener, Gender Based
Treaty Law, supra note 42, at 87-88.
92. International Convention for the Suppression of the Traffic in Women of Full Age,
Oct. 11, 1933, 53 U.N.T.S. 49; 1949 Convention, supra note 46, preamble, 96
U.N.T.S. at 272.
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trafficking in white women only.93 Specifically, nations pledged to ex-
change information and monitor ports and railway stations so that
traffickers in white women under the age of twenty (and women over
twenty when they had been abducted for immoral purposes by fraud,
violence, threats, abuse of authority, or other means of constraint) could
be punished.
94
The Commission used race-neutral terminology in the 1949 Con-
vention, thereby rejecting the discriminatory language found in the
earlier "white slave traffic" treaties.95 The Commission also included
sex-neutral language, in part to extend the scope of the earlier treaties
to include traffic in young boys. 96 The Convention framers also recog-
nized the link between the illegal international trafficking in women
and the legal market for women's bodies, centered around houses of
prostitution. 9
7
The 1949 Convention's substantive terms are explicit and clear in
comparison to the terms of some subsequent gender-based treaties. 98
Instead of general admonitions, the 1949 Convention specifies, in
Articles I through 4, that procurers, brothel keepers and managers,
consumers who "exploit" the prostitution of others, and those who
93. Schmidt am Bursch, supra note 15. See aLro NATALE KAUFMAN HEVENER. INTERNA-
TIONAL LAW AND THE STATUS OF WOMEN (1983); UNTED NATIONS, ECONOMIC
AND SOCIAL COUNCIL, COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS, SuB-COMMISSION ON
PREVENTION OF DISCRIMINATION AND PROTECTION OF MINORmES, WORMNG
GROUP ON SLAVERY; SUPPRESSION OF THE TRAFFIC IN PERSONS AND OF THE Ex-
PLOITATION OF THE PROSTITUTION OF OTHERS: NOTE BY THE SECRETARY-GENERAL,
U.N. Doc. EICN.4ISub.2AC.215 (1976) [hereinafter SUPPRESSION OF THE TRAFFIC
IN PERSONS].
94. KAUFMAN HEVENER, supra note 93, at 78-102.
95. 1949 Convention, supra note 46.
96. 1949 Convention, supra note 46, art. 1, 96 U.N.T.S. at 274. For some discussion
of sex-neutral language in gender-based treaty law, see Kaufman Hevener, Gender
Based Treaty Law, supra note 42, at 85-86.
97. Thus, the U.N. implicitly recognized that the legalized prostitution industry was
connected to illegal trafficking activity. See SUPPRESSION OF THE TRAFFIC IN
PERSONS, supra note 93. Because the Convention arguably legalizes prostitution, the
framers must have believed that sex for money "by choice" was an acceptable state
of affairs.
98. Compare Articles 1 and 2 of the 1949 Convention, supra note 46, arts. 1-2, 96
U.N.T.S. at 274, which read, in part: 'The Parties to the present convention agree
to punish any person.., who... [p]rocures, entices or leads away, for purposes of
prostitution, another person. .. ." with the trafficking prohibition in Article 6 of
CEDAW: "States Parties shall take all appropriate measures, including legislation, to
suppress all forms of traffic in women and exploitation of prostitution of others."
CEDAW, supra note 45, art. 6, 1249 U.N.T.S. at 17.
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knowingly rent buildings to pimps should be punished.9 9 In addition,
the Convention divides punishable offenses into two categories,
preparatory acts 0 0 and intentional participation.10 1 These categories
dictate when prohibited activities are actionable and preclude certain
affirmative defenses. 10 2 The Convention resolves potential ambiguities,
such as the meanings of "punish" 10 3 and "consent,"' 0 4 by referring to
domestic law.
10 5
The treaty's language, while generally clear, contains some un-
resolved ambiguities.' 0 6 The terms "prostitution" and "exploits" in
Article I are not defined in the treaty. The treaty also does not explain
how pimps, procurers, and consumers of prostitution are to be
"punished."
The 1949 Convention was the first of several gender-based treaty
99. 1949 Convention, supra note 46, arts. 1-4, 96 U.N.T.S. at 274.
100. 1949 Convention, supra note 46, art. 3, 96 U.N.T.S. at 274.
ioi. 1949 Convention, supra note 46, art. 4, 96 U.N.T.S. at 274.
102. For a more complete description of the meaning of the 1949 Convention, see
KAuFmAN HEVENER, supra note 93, at 78-79.
103. 1949 Convention, supra note 46, arts. 1-2, 96 U.N.TS. at 274.
104. 1949 Convention, supra note 46, art. 1, 96 U.N.T.S. at 274.
105. 1949 Convention, supra note 46, arts. 3-4, 96 U.N.T.S. at 274.
106. Courts must interpret ambiguous treaty language in order to determine whether a
state's implementation methods comply with the treaty. The Vienna Convention on
the Law of Treaties (Vienna Convention) governs the interpretation of international
treaties. HENKIN ET Ai-, supra note 44, at 387. See also James F. Hogg, The Inter-
national Court:. Rules of Treaty Interpretation, 43 MrNN. L. Rnv. 369 (1959) (descri-
bing interpretative methods used in construction of international instruments).
Under the Vienna Convention's rules for the interpretation of treaties, treaties are
to be interpreted "in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be
given to the terms of the treaty in their context and in the light of [the treaty's]
object and purpose." Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969,
art. 31, 8 I.L.M. 678, 691-92 [hereinafter Vienna Convention]. The International
Court of Justice construes this clause to mean that the plain language of an inter-
national agreement controls, whenever possible, in disputes over the meaning of
treaty terms. HEwlaN Er A., supra note 44, at 448.
Pursuant to the Vienna Convention, "the prepatory work of [a] treaty and the
circumstances of its conclusion" are supplementary means of interpretation. See
Vienna Convention, supra, art. 31, 8 I.L.M. at 691-92. These supplementary
means should be utilized only after a treaty is interpreted with its ordinary meaning.
Vienna Convention, supra, art. 31, 8 I.L.M. at 691-92. For this reason, courts and
commentators have often neglected to consider the history behind the 1949 Con-
vention. Barry, supra note 63. Thus, records documenting the intentions of its
framers are not readily available.
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instruments. 10 7 Despite the faults of this treaty, it is helpful to study its
framers' motivations in order to understand the meaning of modern
and more ambiguous treaties.
C. CEDAW
The next convention to specifically prohibit trafficking in women
"replace[d] protective [language] with non-discriminatory language."' 08
The Commission prepared this new treaty, the Convention on the
Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women
(CEDAW), during the United Nations Decade for Women in 1979.109
CEDAW addresses a broad range of issues related to the sexual ex-
ploitation of women, including nationality rights (Article 9), discrimina-
tion in education (Article io), discrimination in employment (Article
II), and discrimination in marriage (Article 16).110 CEDAW resulted
107. The United Nations adopted several Conventions related to the status of women
shortly after the 1949 Convention came into force. These instruments induded the
Convention on the Political Rights of Women, openedfor signature Mar. 31, 1953,
193 U.N.T.S. 135; the Convention on the Nationality of Married Women, Feb.
20, 1957, 309 U.N.T.S. 65; the Convention Against Discrimination in Education,
Dec. 14, 1960, 429 U.N.T.S. 93; and the Convention on Consent to Marriage,
Minimum Age for Marriage, and Registration of Marriages, Dec. 10, 1962, 521
U.N.T.S. 231. For a description of Conventions drafted by the Commission
between 1949 and 1976, see Kaufman Hevener, Status of Women, supra note 41.
In 1946, the Commission on the Status of Women redrafted two prior conven-
tions that were intended to protect working women. The two conventions were the
Convention Concerning the Employment of Women on Underground Work in
Mines of All Kinds, July 22, 1946, 81 U.N.T.S. 147, and the Convention Con-
cerning Night Work of Women Employed in Industry, June 21, 1935, 40
U.N.T.S. 63, originally drafted by the General Conference of the International
Labour Organization. The Commission revised and modified these documents
beginning in 1948. See Kaufman Hevener, Gender Based Treaty Law, supra note 42.
In stark contrast to the equality goals set forth by the Commission on the Status of
Women during its first session, these new treaties suggested that working women
were similar to children, inferior to men in the workplace, and in need of state
protection. See KAurAN HEVENER, supra note 93, at 6-9. The two treaties called
for the total exclusion of women from mining and night work because, according to
one commentator's analysis of the Commission's view, women are "essentially
familial and... incapable of functioning with full responsibility outside the home."
KAuFmANN H ENER, supra note 93, at 7, 57-62, 67-77 (containing full text of
these two Conventions).
108. Kaufman Hevener, Gender Based Treaty Law, supra note 42, at 73.
109. CEDAW, supra note 45, 1249 U.N.T.S. 14.
11o. CEDAW, supra note 45, arts. 9-11, 16, 1249 U.N.T.S. at 17-19, 20.
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from the work of international women's rights groups 111 which
persuaded the General Assembly to open the treaty for signature and
convinced twenty-two states to ratify the document in i98o and 1981.112
In September 1981, the twentieth state party ratified CEDAW,113
making it enforceable faster than any previous human rights conven-
tion.11
4
Article 6 of CEDAW is the trafficking provision. This provision
mandates that "States Parties shall take all appropriate measures, includ-
ing legislation, to suppress all forms of traffic in women and exploita-
tion of prostitution of women." 1
15
Article 6 leaves much to be desired as a legally binding and
enforceable provision because its language is vague and undefined. First,
under Article 6 it is unclear what "measures" qualify as "appropriate."
Does "appropriate" legislation include job training for prostituted
women, or their arrest and imprisonment? Second, in order to "sup-
press" trafficking in women, must a state impose a ban with fines or
other criminal penalties or is a state simply required to officially con-
demn prostitution? Given the vagueness of Article 6, it is unclear
whether states must characterize prostitution as an institution built
upon coercion and slavery, or whether they can characterize prostitution
as a legitimate economic choice.
The preamble of the treaty provides some answers to such ques-
tions. The preamble establishes that CEDAW's framers considered
trafficking in women to be sex discrimination because "[t]he thirty
articles of The [sic] Convention set out, in legal form, internationally
accepted principles and measures to achieve equal rights for women
everywhere in the world."" 6 In particular, the preamble recognizes that,
despite earlier gender-based treaties, "extensive discrimination against
111. Many groups participated in the drafting of the Convention and many more advo-
cated its opening for signature on March 1, 1980. The Caribbean Women's As-
sociation (CARIWA), the Inter-American Bar Association, and the Caribbean
Association for Feminist Research and Action (CAFRA) are examples of groups that
actively participated in the treaty making process. See WOMEN'S Mov/mENTs OF
rsm WoRD (Sally Shreir ed., 1988) (a comprehensive list, including addresses, of
feminist organizations, many of whom worked on CEDAW).
112. See Byrnes, supra note 2, at 3 (statistics on ratification).
113. Cook, Reservations to CEDAW, supra note 52, at 643.
114. Cook, Reservations to CEDAW, supra note 52, at 643.
115. CEDAW, supra note 45, art. 6, 1249 U.N.T.S. at 17.
116. Billie Heller, International Convention on Women's Rights: Bringing about Ratification
in the United States, 9 WHrIrER L. Rmav. 431 (1987).
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women continues to exist." 1 1 7 The Convention proclaims that "all
human beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights and that
everyone is entitled to all the rights and freedoms set forth therein,
without distinction of any kind, including distinction based on sex." n 8
CEDAW builds on the tradition established when the Commission
on the Status of Women articulated its equality goals. CEDAW's
framers intended it to be an extension and a consolidation of earlier
treaties. 119 However, the framers also recognized that earlier conven-
tions failed to end sex discrimination in the signatory nations. 120 There-
fore, CEDAW's purpose was to prohibit activities that the framers
viewed as sex discrimination. 121 Given this history, the prohibition in
Article 6 against trafficking in women is, by implication, makes traffick-
ing in women a violation of women's equality rights.
This point is significant because it provides us with answers to
some questions about the meaning of Article 6. Under an equality
analysis, measures which protect women's equality rights qualify as
"appropriate measures including legislation" under the treaty. Because
trafficking is a crime which violates women's equality rights, legislation
designed to "suppress" trafficking must end, and not simply reshape, sex
trafficking. Also, any measures which punish the victims of trafficking
through imprisonment, fines, and other means, are inappropriate
remedies under the Convention.
D. The Convention Against Sexual Exploitation
The most recent effort to create international law prohibiting trafficking
has been directed by Dr. Kathleen Barry.122 With Dorchen Leidholdt,123
Barry founded the Coalition Against Trafficking in Women, an inter-
national feminist human rights organization. The Coalition is a non-
governmental organization in Category II consultative status with the
United Nations Economic and Social Council. 124 Therefore, the Coali-
117. CEDAW, supra note 45, preamble, 1249 U.N.T.S. at 15.
118. CEDAW, supra note 45, preamble, 1249 U.N.T.S. at 14.
119. See U.N. ESCOR, 28th Sess., Supp. No. 5, at 56-61, U.N. Doc. E/CN.6/642
(1980).
120. CEDAW, supra note 45, preamble, 1249 U.N.T.S. at 14.
121. Teachnor, supra note 2, at 42.
122. Professor of Sociology, Pennsylvania State University, State College, PA.
123. Criminal defense attorney on staff at the New York City Legal Aid Society and
Adjunct Professor at the City University of New York School of Law.
124. See History and Statement of Purpose, supra note 9, at 4.
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tion can submit reports and testimony to the Commission on the
Status of Women. The Commission on the Status of Women then
submits reports to the Economic and Social Council which, in turn,
submits reports to the General Assembly.125
The Coalition is currently drafting a Convention Against Sexual
Exploitation (CASE) with the involvement of women and activist
feminist organizations all over the world. 126 Like CEDAW, CASE will
be a universal document, meaning that it targets many forms of dis-
crimination. Proponents say that CASE goes beyond CEDAW because
it recognizes that all forms of discrimination against women are con-
nected to women's sexual subordination.127 Additionally, CASE, as a
human rights document, recognizes that prostitution is also a human
rights violation. 128
If implemented, CASE could be the most important treaty con-
cerning trafficking because its language expressly states that trafficking
in women is sex discrimination.129 The Convention would therefore
establish the principle, introduced implicitly in earlier documents, that
trafficking in women violates international law because it violates a
trafficked woman's right to sex equality. This express statement would
eliminate problems inherent in interpreting vague treaty language. 130
E. International Treaty Interpretation
Until CASE is enacted, activists attempting to prevent trafficking in
125. See generally Galey, Promoting Nondiscrimination, supra note 60 (discussing
protocol).
126. Barry, supra note 63.
127. Dorchen Leidholdt, International Solutions, Panel Presentation at the Michigan
Journal of Gender & Law Symposium, Prostitution: From Academia to Activism (Oct.
31, 1992) (videotape on file with the Michigan Journal of Gender & Law).
128. Elements of a New U.N. Convention Against Sexual Exploitation (The Coalition
Against Trafficking in Women, State College, PA), 1992.
129. The Coalition Against Trafficking in Women completed a draft of CASE early in
1994. The Convention appears to not have been formally considered by either the
General Assembly or the Commission on the Status of Women. Several important
questions appear to be unresolved. For instance: what enforcement mechanisms the
Convention will have; how the Coalition will submit the Convention to the
General Assembly; whether the Convention will go through the Commission on the
Status of Women, which could alter or refuse to submit it to the General Assembly;
or whether it can submit the Convention directly to the General Assembly. Without
a state party sponsor, this last possibility seems unlikely.
130. For a discussion of treaty interpretation, see supra note 106.
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women through international treaty law must address the fact that
obtaining enforcement of the gender-based treaties requires utilizing
language which is often vague and ambiguous. When a treaty's terms
are ambiguous, treaty interpretation requires reliance on the general
methods of interpretation prescribed in the Vienna Convention. 131
Courts and commentators sometimes neglect to examine the
history of a convention. 132 However, some evidence suggests that the
drafters of the conventions prohibiting trafficking believed in a woman's
right to be free from discrimination based on sex. 133 Nations which
signed the trafficking conventions similarly understood that the
members of the Commission on the Status of Women were influenced
by a sex equality principle.1 34 Given this evidence, it is important to
recognize that the motivating principles of the framers, as well as the
general history of gender-based treaty law, provide clues which should
be recognized when determining the substantive meaning of any am-
biguous terms in the gender-based treaties. Although the plain language
and subject matters of the treaties must also be given their due, in the
future activists should work to ensure that the history of anti-trafficking
treaty law and the goals of its' framers inform the courts, and others,
who must construe this law.
II. THE ENFORCEABILITY OF INTERNATIONAL
TRAFFICKING PROHIBITIONS
The international conventions calling for the prevention of trafficking
in women purport to be legally binding.13 The United Nations
Charter further mandates that the U.N. shall promote and enforce
human rights for all people without distinction as to sex. 136 However,
131. See supra note 106 for a discussion of interpretation methods.
132. See Barry, supra note 63 (discussing the 1949 Convention); HENKIN ET AL., supra
note 44, at 442-51 (discussing arguments for and against framers intent as a tool of
interpretation).
133. See supra notes 59-64 and accompanying text.
134. Under the Vienna Convention, treaty signatories look to documents issued by the
drafters of an instrument to determine its meaning. Therefore, it is the intent of the
drafters and not the views of the states parties developed during ratification debates,
that is significant. See HENKIN ET. AL., supra note 44, at 446-47.
135. The Vienna Convention mandates in Artide 26 that "[every treaty in force is
binding upon the parties to it and must be performed by them in good faith."
Vienna Convention, supra note 106, art. 26, 8 IL.M. at 690.
136. U.N. CHArTaR art. 1, 3.
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"[d]espite the contribution of the U.N. Commission on the Status of
Women in defining an international norm prohibiting discrimination
against women, the international enforcement of women's rights has
been especially dismal... ."137 This section identifies the principal
reasons why efforts to enforce the anti-trafficking principle in the 1949
Convention and CEDAW have been unsuccessful. 138 Although these
international conventions contain important substantive elements, this
section concludes that the treaties cannot be successfully enforced.
One reason trafficking in women still exists is because national
governments lack the will to stop it. One scholar argues:
Efforts to enforce women's rights have been doubly disad-
vantaged .... The primary enforcement mechanism, national
governments, often lack the political will or resources to
promote compliance with the standards that they have
obligated themselves to support. Furthermore, because women
are often treated as "second class" citizens in many countries
of the world, governmental efforts to promote their rights
have an even lower priority, or may be virtually nonexistent.
Those nations that do possess the necessary political will and
resources, and go on to initiate concerted efforts to protect
human rights, often direct their efforts at target minority
groups. Because women have not been viewed as a discrete
and insular "minority" in most societies, they normally have
not come within the targeted groups requiring special
governmental assistance to promote their rights.
139
Many of the governments that signed the 1949 Convention and
CEDAW often ignore trafficking in their countries. 140 These govern-
ments are unwilling to devote resources to anti-trafficking enforcement
and to consider allegations of sexual slavery brought to their attention
by the Commission on the Status of Women, the Committee on the
Elimination of Discrimination Against Women, and other human rights
137. Galey, International Enfrrcement, supra note 48, at 463.
138. Because CASE was in draft form when this essay was written, we do not attempt to
predict whether CASE may have greater enforcement possibilities. Whatever
enforcement mechanisms the drafters of that Convention choose, they will confront
many of the obstacles described in this section.
139. Galey, International Enfbrcement, supra note 48, at 463-64.
140. For a survey of national governments' information and statistics on trafficking in
women, see BARRY, supra note 33, at 283-98. See also Ernst, supra note 13.
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and women's groups. Some governments even blatantly ignore their
obligations under the Conventions. For example, Japan signed and
ratified the i949 Convention. Despite this, Japan still fails to address
the organized pimping networks in Tokyo and Osaka, the daily flights
which transport Korean, European, and American businessmen to the
brothels and sex shows of Kyoto, and the geisha houses which still exist
even though they were formally banned by the Diet in 1957.141
Another impediment to the abolition of trafficking is that many
industrialized countries have refused to sign the 1949 Convention or
CEDAW because they are legally binding.1 42 In fact, only sixty states
parties have signed and ratified the 1949 Convention 143 and, as of
November 1994, only 136 countries had ratified or acceded to
CEDAW.144 The United States has not yet ratified either the 1949
Convention or CEDAW.
145
In addition, despite their substantive potential, the treaties are
unenforceable because their enforcement structures are, at best, in-
adequate. Most significantly, individuals have no remedies under the
141. Asian Governments Pander to Sex Tourists, supra note 9, at 14-16. See also History
and Statement of Purpose, supra note 9; J. Mark Ramseyer, Indentured Prostitution in
Imperial Japan. Credible Commitments in the Commercial Sex Industr, 7 J.L EcoN.
& ORG. 89 (1991) (tracing historic organization of prostitution in Japan).
142. Schmidt am Bursch, supra note 15.
143. Schmidt am Bursch, supra note 15. These states parties include the Philippines,
Argentina, Morocco, Brazil, Mexico, Syria, Egypt, and Japan. Schmidt am Bursch,
supra note 15. Neither Great Britain, Germany, nor Thailand are parties to the
Convention. Schmidt am Bursch, supra note 15.
144. Lynne Marek, Scoring Congress on Family Issues, Cm. Tm., Nov. 6, 1994,
Womanews Section, at 12. China, Cuba, Germany, Guyana, Haiti, Mexico, Poland,
Sweden, and the USSR are among the nations that have ratified this agreement.
CEDAW, supra note 45, 1249 U.N.T.S. at 14.
145. President Jimmy Carter signed CEDAW on behalf of the United States on July 17,
1980, and presented the treaty to the Senate on November 12, 1980, to obtain its
advice and consent. Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination
Against Women: Message from the President of the United States Transmitting the
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women,
Adopted by the United Nations General Assembly on December iR, '979, and Signed on
Behalf of the United States ofAmerican on July7, go, S. Exec. R., 96th Cong., 2d
Sess. (1980). However, the Senate held no hearings on the Convention until early
in 1974. THEODOR MERON, HUMAN RIGHTS LAW-MAKING IN THE UNITED
NATrONs 53-82 (1986); Schmidt am Bursch, supra note 15. See alo Marek, supra
note 144. After brief consideration, the Senate blocked passage of a bill which
would have granted United States ratification to the Convention. Because of the
Senate's failure to act, CEDAW has no legal effect in the United States. Marek,
supra note 144.
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terms of these international instruments. Therefore, the 1949 Conven-
tion and CEDAW permit only a signatory to bring a complaint against
another signatory before the International Court of Justice (ICJ).
146
The treaties do nothing for an individual trafficked woman unless that
woman convinces a signatory to bring a case on her behalf. Since
bringing a legal action against another nation in an international legal
forum costs a great deal of political capital, 147 it is unlikely that a
woman could convince a signatory to pursue her case. 1
48
The Conventions' complicated implementation provisions create a
second problem within their enforcement structures. For example,
CEDAW's enforcement provisions 149  were intended to correct
deficiencies in earlier human rights conventions. 150 These CEDAW
provisions, however, establish committees which are ill-equipped to
enforce the Convention. 151 For example, Article 17(1) of the Conven-
146. For example, a country like Japan can be held accountable for its failure to uphold
its treaty commitments only if another state party is willing to challenge Japan in
court by requesting a hearing before the ICJ. 1949 Convention, supra note 46, art.
22, 96 U.N.T.S. at 284.
147. The political costs involved in bringing a legal action against another nation include
the possibility that the nation might retaliate, legally or economically, against the
nation bringing the complaint. Even if a nation does not fear negative retaliation, it
may ignore human rights violations of other nations in efforts to gain or maintain
positive foreign relations. Moreover, a nation is unlikely to report another state's
violations when it is also violating its own human rights obligations.
148. No nation has ever brought such an action to enforce Article 6 of CEDAW.
Schmidt am Bursch, supra note 15.
149. Many commentators argue that CEDAW contains the most comprehensive enforce-
ment provisions of any of the gender-based treaty instruments. See, e.g.,
Guggenheim, supra note 53, at 242. A few other commentators disagree. See, e.g.,
Schmidt am Bursch, supra note 15. Some commentators argue that the 1949
Convention has more effective enforcement procedures due to its narrowly tailored
prohibition on trafficking; because a state party's treaty obligations are dear, a state
party cannot avoid being cited for a violation by relying on ambiguity in vague
language. Schmidt am Bursch, supra note 15.
We believe that it is easier for a state to avoid a narrow enforcement provision,
like that in the 1949 Convention, because the state can modify its conduct to avoid
the specific conduct prohibited. For example, the 1949 Convention's provisions
may require a state to promulgate laws criminalizing prostitution, but they also fail
to impose an affirmative duty on the state to offer women meaningful economic
alternatives. In contrast, the broader provisions of CEDAW, and perhaps CASE, if
ratified, more explicitly address the connections between male sexual dominance,
poverty, race, education, health, and prostitution. This makes it more difficult for a
state to avoid its obligations.
150. Guggenheim, supra note 53, at 241.
151. In Article 17, CEDAW calls for the election of 23 experts to the Committee on the
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tion calls for the creation of the Committee on the Discrimination
Against Women to consider "the progress made in the implementation
of the present Convention .. -152
Articles zo and zI limit this Committee's powers to considering
reports submitted by states parties regarding the extent of trafficking
problems in their countries and to making recommendations based on
reports and information received from states parties. 153 The reports
from states parties should specify the legislative, judicial, administrative,
or other measures the state party has undertaken to end all forms of
discrimination against women since the last reporting period. 154 Once
the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women
receives a report, however, it is unclear to whom the Committee should
make recommendations. 155
The preparatory work of CEDAW shows that many nations,
including most of the Eastern European countries and India, wanted to
limit the Committee's powers because they feared that a strong com-
mittee would undermine the authority of the Commission on the
Status of Women. 156 On the other hand, a few countries and feminist
Elimination of Discrimination Against Women once 35 states accede or ratify the
Convention. Consequently, after 38 states ratified CEDAW within six months of its
entry into force, the treaty signatories elected members to the Committee on April
16, 1982. UNITED NATIONS: CONVENTION ON THE EUMINATION OF ALL FORMS OF
DIscRImmATION AGAINST WOMEN, MEETING OF THE STATES PARTIES; ELECTIONS
OF THE TWENTY-THREE MEMBERS OF THE COMMIrTrE ON THE ELMINATION OF
DISCRIMINATION AGAINST WOMEN: NOTE BY THE SECRETARY-GENERAL, U.N. Doc.
CEDAW/SP/3 (Apr. 16, 1982). Article 17(3) specifies the election procedure. First,
the Secretary-General invites states parties to submit nominations. Then, the
Secretary-General prepares a list, including biographical data, that is circulated to
states parties. At meetings of states parties, members are elected for four-year terms.
But, in accord with Articles 17(4), (5), and (6), these terms are staggered. CEDAW,
supra note 45, art. 17(4)-(6), 1249 U.N.T.S. at 21. For interesting biographical
information on the women elected to the 1982 and 1984 Committees see Galey,
International Enfircement, supra note 48, at 475-81.
152. CEDAW, supra note 45, art. 17(1), 1249 U.N.T.S. at 21.
153. CEDAW, supra note 45, arts. 20-21, 1249 U.N.T.S. at 22.
154. Galey, International Enforcement, supra note 48, at 482.
155. Galey, International Enforcement, supra note 48, at 482.
156. This has probably happened even though the Secretary-General or the General
Assembly, depending on who receives the recommendation of the Committee on
the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women, is supposed to update the
Commission on the Status of Women. The bifurcation of the people and resources
that are devoted to promoting women's rights effectively diminished the power of
both the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women and the
Commission on the Status of Women. An independent committee was created
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groups wanted the Committee empowered to deliver reports directly to
states parties. 157 However, the General Assembly refused to grant the
Committee such power. Instead, the Committee must request that the
Secretary-General ask a state party for more information or remind a
state party that it is "tardy" in reporting. Thus, the Committee has no
power to ask states parties for reports directly.
158
When a state party submits a report, the Committee is presented
with a report summary by a state party representative. 159 Members of
the Committee can ask questions to clarify the report or to gain more
information. 160 The Committee, which meets annually, usually devotes
one day to consider a state party's report.161 There have been only two
circumstances in the Committee's fourteen-year existence, involving the
Philippines and El Salvador, where the Committee has directly criticized
the content of a state party's report.
162
In addition to listening to reports of states parties, the Committee
prepares an annual report of its own. 163 Many commentators believe
that this is CEDAW's most significant power. 164 The Committee's
report includes sections on the status of ratification of the Convention,
the Committee's agenda, and the Committee's consideration of the
under CEDAW and placed under the Economic and Social Council because the
Commission on the Status of Women was overloaded with work. The only form of
communication formally permitted between these two Committees is a reporting
communication which must go through at least two other bodies first-namely, the
Economic and Social Council and the Secretary-General. Therefore, the people who
are fighting to end sexual exploitation have been institutionally divided. See generally
Galey, International En.ircement, supra note 48.
157. Having such power would have been particularly important to the Committee
because the Committee then could have given its opinion about the legal effect of a
state party's reservation to the Convention. If an interpretive dispute were ever
brought before the ICJ under Article 29, it is undear what deference the Commit-
tee's opinions would be given. CEDAW, supra note 45, art. 29, 1249 U.N.T.S. at
23.
158. Historically the reporting rate has been very low. In 1984 and 1985, four out of
nine western nations that had ratified the Convention did not submit reports when
they were due. For further statistics on reporting rates, see Report of the Committee
on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women, U.N. GAOR, 39th Sess., Supp.
No. 45, Annexes 1 & 2, at 51-54, U.N. Doc. A139/45 (1984).
159. Galey, International Enfircement, supra note 48, at 484.
160. Galey, International Enforcement, supra note 48, at 484.
161. Galey, International Enforcement, supra note 48, at 484-85.
162. Byrnes, supra note 2, at 20.
163. Galey, International Enforcement, supra note 48, at 487-88.
164. Byrnes, supra note 2, at 6.
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states parties' reports. 165 The report also assesses the timeliness of states
parties' submissions. 166 This report is important because it is published
and transmitted to the Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) and
the U.N. General Assembly. 167 Therefore, a state's failure to prevent the
sexual exploitation and enslavement of women in prostitution is docu-
mented and subjected to international scrutiny to the extent that the
world is interested. Such documentation may exert some pressure on
nations to implement the substantive provisions of the Convention. 168
There have been many problems with CEDAW's enforcement
procedures. First, according to a recent assessment issued by the U.N.
Secretary-General, the Committee "faces constraints unmatched by the
other committees monitoring global human rights instruments." 169 The
Secretary-General's report, for example, "speaks of 'striking disparities'
in the working conditions" of the Committee, compared to other
human rights treaty committees. The report also indicates that a special
problem facing the Committee is "the amount of time available for the
consideration of country reports." 170 Unlike similar monitoring com-
mittees, the Committee must hold its annual meetings within one two-
week period. By contrast, the U.N. Human Rights Committee meets
for three three-week sessions each year. 171 Second, reports occasionally
are not submitted to ECOSOC in time for that body to read them and
submit them to the General Assembly for action.1'7 2 The Committee on
the Discrimination Against Women may not impose sanctions on states
parties that do not submit reports or that strategically submit them too
late for recommendations to be made to ECOSOC. 1' 3 Third, CEDAW
has no timetable for state action to end trafficking and no independent
evidence gathering mechanism. Instead, the Committee must rely on
the state party for information and compliance. Thus, CEDAW's
enforcement capabilities do not match the inspiring language of its
165. Galey, International Enforcement, supra note 48, at 486.
166. Galey, International Enforcement, supra note 48, at 486.
167. Galey, International Enforcement, supra note 48, at 488.
168. Galey', International Enforcement, supra note 48, at 488.
169. Jaya Dayal, Women-Human Rights: Constraints Choke Monitoring Body, Int'l Press
Serv., Oct. 18, 1994, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Wire File.
170. Dayal, supra note 169.
171. Dayal, supra note 169.
172. UNAction in the Field of Human Rights, U.N. Doc. ST/HR/2/Rev. 2 (1983).
173. UNAction in the Field of Human Rights, U.N. Doc. ST/HR/2/Rev. 2 (1983).
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substantive terms. 174
Further, the ratification successes achieved by international feminist
organizations and others have been undermined by the substantive
reservations17 5 that over thirty states parties have made to CEDAW.
176
CEDAW is riddled with reservations: over eighty substantive reserva-
tions have been made to the instrument's first twelve articles. 177 An
additional twenty-five reservations have been made to Article 29, which
discusses dispute settlement. 178 These reservations significantly diminish
CEDAW's legal force and effect.
179
All of these problems make the international treaties concerning
trafficking in women practically unenforceable despite their substantive
potential. In theory, the international treaties move toward establishing
a principle that trafficking in women is sex discrimination. In practice,
however, such treaties provide the individual trafficked woman with
only minimal opportunity for relief.
III. PROHIBITIONS ON TRAFFICKING UNDER REGIONAL
HUMAN RIGHTS TREATIES
In addition to United Nations conventions prohibiting trafficking, there
are regional charters and human rights documents which prohibit
trafficking in women expressly or implicitly. Presently, three regional
human rights conventions exist: the European Convention for the
Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (European
Convention), the American Convention on Human Rights (American
Convention), and the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights
174. Galey, International Enforcement, supra note 48, 464-66. For a comprehensive
bibliography of works about CEDAW, including many of the works cited above,
see Cook, Bibliography, supra note 50; Rebecca J. Cook, Women's International
Human Rights: A Bibliography, 24 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L &s POL. 645 (1992).
175. Reservations are qualifications that states parties make to any international agree-
ment that they sign. States making reservations can avoid treaty obligations or
withdraw from the treaty entirely under certain specified circumstances. Cook,
Reservations to CEDAW supra note 52, at 644, 650.
176. Report of the Commission on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women, U.N.
GAOR, 39th Sess., Supp. No. 45, U.N. Doc. A145/38 (Feb. 8, 1990).
177. UNrrED NATIONS, MuLTiLATERAL TREATIES DEPOSITED WITH THE SECRTARY-
GENERAL: STATUS AS OF 31 DECEMBER 1993, U.N. Doc. ST/LEG/SER.E/12 (1994).
178. Cook, Reservations to CEDAW, supra note 52, at 709.
179. Cook, Reservations to CEDAW, supra note 52, at 648. For a more in depth analysis
of the problems of reservations in CEDAW, see generally Cook, Reservations to
CEDAW, supra note 52.
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(African Charter). l80 This section explores the substantive regional
human rights principles which may prohibit trafficking in women. It
also examines the procedures in the regional systems which may allow
effective enforcement of the substantive principles.
These regional human rights guarantees may more effectively
protect trafficked women than the global human rights documents for
two main reasons. First, creating substantive law on a regional level may
minimize conflicting human rights principles. For example, one com-
mentator argues that the establishment and enforcement of women's
rights as human rights are hindered or precluded by equality principles
that conflict with other human rights principles, such as the freedom to
practice one's own religion. 181 However, states within the same region
are more likely than others to share common cultural and political
values and develop regional human rights obligations which are con-
sistent with these values. Thomas Buergenthal argues that "political and
cultural homogeneity are basic prerequisites for an effective human
rights system, and these are more likely to be found on the regional
plane." 182 This increased consistency between human rights obligations
and other values may increase states' commitments to the terms of a
regional convention.
The European Convention and the American Convention also
establish more advanced enforcement mechanisms than universal human
rights documents. 183 These enforcement structures may result from
greater commitment by states parties to regional human rights obliga-
tions and less fear of a supranational policing force. These enforcement
structures may also be attributed to shared judicial systems and policing
traditions. Buergenthal argues that "[o]ther preconditions for such a
system include reasonably well-developed legal systems as well as shared
is0. European Convention, supra note 1, at 101-35; American Convention on Human
Rights, Nov. 22, 1969, 1970 OAS T.S. No. 36, 9 I.L.M. 673 (entered into force
July 18, 1978) [hereinafter American Convention, cited to 9 I.L.M. 673); African
Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights, Jan. 19, 1981, 21 I.L.M. 58 (entered into
force Oct. 21, 1986) [hereinafter African Charter].
181. THEODOR MERON, HuMAN RIGHTS LAw-MAKING IN THE UNITED NAnONS 53-82
(1986). See also A Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217, U.N.
GAOR, 3rd Sess., at 74 (1948).
182. Thomas Buergenthal, The American and European Conventions on Human Rights:
Similarities and Differences, 30 AM. U. L. REv. 155, 156 (1980). Buergenthal is a
judge on the Inter-American Court.
183. Buergenthal, supra note 182, at 155.
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juridical traditions and institutions."'
84
In contrast to the European and Inter-American systems, the
African Charter establishes one enforcement structure which is primarily
concerned with activities such as collecting information and organizing
educational programs. The African Commission on Human and
Peoples' Rights considers complaints from states concerning violations
of the Charter, however, it can only make non-binding recommenda-
tions to governments. 185 The African system is at an earlier stage of
development and currently lacks effective supranational enforcement
mechanisms. Because of the African Charter's embryonic state, this
essay will not discuss its potential for enforcing trafficking prohibitions.
We focus, then, on the potential and the limitations of the European
and the Inter-American systems as alternative mechanisms for enforcing
international treaty prohibitions on trafficking in women.
A. The European Human Rights System
Many commentators consider the European Convention to be the most
effective international instrument for the protection of individual
rights. 186 It may have the greatest potential for protecting trafficked
women. The European Convention is enforced through three institu-
tions: the European Commission on Human Rights, the European
Court of Human Rights, and the Committee of Ministers of the
European Council. 187 These organizations receive complaints, in-
vestigate alleged human rights violations, work to secure friendly settle-
ments, and create binding decisions as to whether a state party has
violated the human rights provisions of the treaty.
The most important enforcement feature of the European system is
its creation of an individual's right to bring petitions seeking relief from
a state's human rights violations. Pursuant to Article 25:
The Commission may receive petitions ... from any person,
non-governmental organisation or group of individuals claim-
184. Buergenthal, supra note 182, at 156.
185. African Charter, supra note 180, arts. 52-53, 21 I.L.M. at 66.
186. See, e.g., WARWICK McKEAN, EQuALIY AND DISCRIMINATION UNDER INTER-
NATIONAL LAw 204 (1983); J.G. MERRILLs, THE DEVELOPMENT OF INTERNATIONAL
LAW BY THE EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS 17 (1993); Laurence R. Heifer,
Consensus, Coherence and the European Convention on Human Rights, 26 CORNELL
INT'L LJ. 133 (1993).
187. European Convention, supra note 1, arts. 19, 21, at 106-07.
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ing to be the victim of a violation by one of the High Con-
tracting Parties of the rights set forth in this Convention
188
Therefore, individuals can hold states accountable for breaches of inter-
national treaty obligations under the European Convention.
Under Article 25, individual petitions must be submitted by a
victim of the alleged violation.189 Thus, a complaining individual must
be affected by the violation. Individuals cannot complain about "a law
in abstracto simply because they feel that it contravenes the Conven-
tion." 190 However, the European Court of Human Rights has held that
Article 2.5 does not require actual harm to the victim, as long as the
applicant risks being directly affected by the alleged violation of the
Convention. 191
As stated in Part II, access to enforcement is absent in the United
Nations human rights structures. 192 In contrast to the European Court,
a complaint alleging that a state has harmed an individual must be filed
by another state on the individual's behalf in order to bring a case
before the ICJ. 193 This requirement effectively eliminates any remedy
for individuals harmed by their own state's human rights violations. In
addition, this lack of individual access places individual rights at the
mercy of political machinery. Governments may be reluctant to respond
to human rights violations by other states for a variety of political
reasons, such as gaining or maintaining favorable foreign relations.
Moreover, states are unlikely to report another state's violations when
they are also violating their own human rights obligations.
The European system appears to have a relatively liberal right of
petition. However, several procedural requirements of the European
Convention limit an individual's access to enforcement. First, the right
of an individual to petition for relief is conditional on the state's ac-
ceptance of that right. Therefore, the European Commission may
188. European Convention, supra note 1, art. 25, at 107-08.
189. European Convention, supra note 1, art. 25, at 107-08.
190. Klass v. Germany, 28 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 18 (1978). See also X, Cabales and
Balkandali v. United Kingdom, App. Nos. 9214/80, 9473/81, 9474/81, 5 Eur.
H.R. Rep. 132, 137 (1983)(Comrnission report).
191. Johnston v. Ireland, 9 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 216 (1986).
192. Statute of the International Court of Justice, June 26, 1945, art. 34, 59 Stat. 1055,
1059 ("Only states may be parties in cases before the Court.").
193. Statute of the International Court of Justice, June 26, 1945, art. 34, 59 Star. 1055,
1059.
[Vol. 2:83
1994] LEGAL PROHIBITIONS ON TRAFFICKING IN WOMEN 115
receive a petition from an individual or group only if the state alleged
in the petition to have violated the Convention explicitly recognizes the
Commission's competence to receive such complaints. 194 Although
many European states were slow to recognize the competence of the
Commission, 195 today all twenty-three states that are parties to the
Convention accept the Commission's jurisdiction to receive individual
complaints. 196 Therefore, an individual complaint is effective against
every member state.
Another obstacle to individual petitions may exist because the
Commission must determine the admissibility of an individual com-
plaint under Articles z6197 and 27. 198 Article z6 enables the Commis-
sion to consider individual petitions only "after all domestic remedies
have been exhausted. . "...199 However, Article 26 has been applied
with the explicit understanding that the domestic "remedies must be
194. European Convention, supra note 1, art. 25, at 107-08.
195. Article 25(2), however, states that "[sluch declarations may be made for a specific
period." Thus, acceptance of the Court's jurisdiction is not necessarily permanent.
European Convention, supra note 1, art. 25(2), at 108.
196. Gates Garrity-Rokous & Raymond H. Brescia, Procedural Justice and International
Human Rights: Toward a Procedural Jurisprudence for Human Rights Tribunals, 18
YALE J. INT'L L. 559, 572 (1993).
197. Article 26 states:
The Commission may only deal with the matter after all domestic
remedies have been exhausted, according to the generally recognised rules
of international law, and within a period of six months from the date on
which the final decision was taken.
European Convention, supra note 1, art. 26, at 108.
198. Article 27 states:
1. The Commission shall not deal with any petition submitted under
Article 25 which:
(a) is anonymous, or
(b) is substantially the same as a matter which has already been ex-
amined by the Commission or has already been submitted to another
procedure of international investigation or settlement and if it contains
no relevant new information.
2. The Commission shall consider inadmissible any petition submitted
under Article 25 which it considers incompatible with the provisions of
the present Convention, manifestly iU-foundet [sic], or an abuse of the
right of petition.
3. The Commission shall reject any petition referred to it which it con-
siders inadmissible under Article 26.
European Convention, supra note 1, art. 27, at 108.
199. European Convention, supra note 1, art. 26, at 108.
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sufficiently certain not only in theory but also in practice, failing which
they will lack the requisite accessibility and effectiveness" to allow a
respondent state to defeat an individual's claim on the basis of non-
exhaustion. 2
00
Article z7(z) directs the Commission to declare inadmissible any
petition which seems "incompatible" with the Convention's
provisions. 20' This article has been interpreted to prevent the Commis-
sion from hearing complaints outside its competence. For example, a
number of complaints have been rejected on the grounds that they were
directed against private individuals rather than states parties. 20 2 This
limitation may be particularly applied to dismiss complaints of women
victimized by pimps. However, Article I of the European Convention
also states that "[t]he High Contracting Parties shall secure to everyone
within their jurisdiction the rights and freedoms defined in Section I of
this Convention." 20 3 Article I has been interpreted to reach state inac-
tion where legislation is necessary to protect the rights established by
the Convention. "[I]f a violation of one of those rights and freedoms is
the result of non-observance of that obligation in the enactment of
domestic legislation, the responsibility of the State for that violation is
engaged." 20 4 Thus, using Article I as the jurisdictional basis, a petition
by a trafficked woman may be framed as a complaint against a state
party under Article z7.
The procedural limitations of Articles z6 and 27 may seem
reasonable. However, one author has asserted that despite early declara-
tions by the Commission that its admissibility standards would be
applied less vigorously than those of national courts, in reality the
Commission relies heavily on procedural obstacles to control its
200. Johnston v. Ireland, 9 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 216 (1986).
201. European Convention, supra note 1, art. 27(2), at 108.
202. App. No. 9348/81 v. United Kingdom, 5 Eur. H.R. Rep. 504, 504 (1983):
The Commission also finds that the applicant's complaint, concerning the
killing of her husband by terrorists, raises the question of State responsibility
for the protection of the right to life in accordance with Art. 2 of the
Convention. It follows that this complaint cannot be dedared inadmissible,
under Art. 27(2), as being incompatible with the Convention ... on the
ground that it is directed against acts of private persons.
203. European Convention, supra note 1, art. 1, at 102.
204. Young, James and Webster v. United Kingdom, App. Nos. 7601/76 and 7806/77,
44 Eur. Ct. H.R (ser. A) at 20 (1981).
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docket.20 5 Another author has stated that ninety percent of all petitions
submitted are ruled inadmissible by the Commission. 20 6 Thus, these
limitations may act as substantial obstacles and reduce the chance that a
trafficked woman will have her claims considered by the Commission.
A final procedural limitation may prevent an individual petitioner
from obtaining relief against a state. The Commission receives petitions
but does not make the final determination on any case. 207 Rather, it
investigates petitions and attempts to facilitate a settlement between the
parties. If no setdement is reached, the Commission reports its findings
of fact and its non-binding opinion on the case.208 Under Article 44,
the Commission or a state party may then refer a case to the European
Court of Human Rights for a binding determination. 20 9 In theory, this
places an individual at the mercy of the Commission's discretion, or her
government's discretion, to refer cases. In practice, however, the Com-
mission generally refers an individual's case to the Court as long as the
defendant state has accepted the Court's jurisdiction.210 Since all
twenty-three states parties to the Convention have accepted the Court's
jurisdiction to resolve disputes, an individual should be able to obtain a
binding decision of the Court.
211
Moreover, if the case is not referred to the Court, an individual
205. Garrity-Rokous and Brescia state:
In 1991, for example, the Commission opened 5,550 provisional files.
Following an initial response to each petitioner, the Secretariat formerly
registered 1,648 applications. The Commission subsequently deemed
1,261 of the petitions inadmissible following a fill review, and declared
180 more inadmissible upon communication with the respondent state.
The Commission ultimately declared only 217 petitions admissible, and
later rejected one of these petitions on admissibility grounds during its
review of the merits.
Garrity-Rokous & Brescia, supra note 196, at 586.
206. Nanette Dumas, Enforcement of Human Rights Standards: An International Human
Rights Court and Other Proposals, 13 HAStIGs INT'L & COMP. L. Ray. 585 (1990).
207. European Convention, supra note 1, art. 31, at 109.
208. European Convention, supra note 1, arts. 28-31, at 108-09.
209. Article 47 grants the Court jurisdiction over a case, only "after the Commission has
acknowledged the failure of efforts for a friendly settlement .... " European
Convention, supra note 1, art. 47, at 112. Further, Article 48 gives the Court
jurisdiction only over High Contracting Parties which have accepted compulsory
jurisdiction under Artide 46 or which consent to jurisdiction in a particular case.
European Convention, supra note 1, art. 48, at 112.
21o. Garrity-Rokous & Brescia, supra note 196, at 572.
211. Garrity-Rokous & Brescia, supra note 196, at 572.
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can still obtain a binding decision, because any case which is not
referred to the Court is automatically decided by a two-thirds vote of
the Committee of Ministers.212 A decision by the Committee of Mini-
sters is as binding as a judgment of the Court.213 The only disad-
vantage of a ministerial decision, instead of a Court decision, is that the
ministers are state representatives, 214 and as such their decision-making
process may be affected by politics. Regardless of whether a case is
heard by the Committee of Ministers or the European Court, an in-
dividual petitioner is likely to receive a binding decision if her com-
plaint overcomes the initial procedural obstacles.
Although the procedural obstacles in the European system seem
relatively minor, the system has limited potential as a means of enforc-
ing trafficking prohibitions. The institutions of the European human
rights system can enforce only the European Convention and no other
human rights conventions. 215 The European Court, for example, cannot
enforce human rights obligations which are contained in CEDAW.
Before a prostitute can bring a successful action, this Convention must
first recognize the right of women to protect themselves from traffick-
ing.21
6
The most useful articles for establishing protection from trafficking
are Article 3, stating "[n]o one shall be subjected to torture or to in-
human or degrading treatment or punishment;"217 Article 4, stating:
212. European Convention, supra note 1, art. 32, at 109. This alternative route to
obtaining a binding decision was created because governments refused to create a
European court whose jurisdiction was compulsory. G.L. WhlL, THE EuRoPEaN
CoNwNoN ON HuMAN aIG rs 140-41 (1963).
213. Whichever body makes the final determination regarding a breach, the decision is
binding on the parties to the dispute. Under Article 53, the contracting parties
.undertake to abide by the decision of the Court in any case to which they are
parties," and under Article 32, the contracting parties "undertake to regard as
binding on them any decision which the Committee of Ministers may take in
application of the preceding paragraphs." European Convention, supra note 1, arts.
32, 53, at 109, 112.
214. The Committee of Ministers consists of the Minister of Foreign Affairs from each
member state. Statute of the Council of Europe, May 5, 1949, arts. 13-14, 8
Europ. T.S. 2, 6.
215. European Convention, supra note 1, arts. 31(1), 32(1), 45, 50, at 109, 111-12.
216. Articles 24 and 25 allow the Commission to receive petitions which allege a viola-
tion of the provisions of the European Convention. If a petition does not meet this
requirement, it will be dismissed. European Convention, supra note 1, arts. 24, 25,
at 107-08.
217. European Convention, supra note 1, art. 3, at 102.
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1. No one shall be held in slavery or servitude.
2. No one shall be required to perform forced or compul-
sory labour;218
and Article 14, stating:
The enjoyment of the rights and freedoms set forth in this
Convention shall be secured without discrimination on any
ground such as sex, race, colour, language, religion, political
or other opinion, national or social origin, association with a
national minority, property, birth or other status.
219
Although the plain language of these provisions does not address
trafficking in women, these principles can and should be interpreted to
protect victims of prostitution. To date, little European system case law
has specifically addressed prostitution, but a few cases suggest that the
Convention prohibits trafficking in women generally. In Cyprus v.
Turkey,220 the European Commission concluded that the raping of
Greek women by Turkish soldiers during the Turkish occupation
constituted inhumane treatment under Article 3.221 The reports of the
Greek government, which were included in the Commission's report on
the case, equated these mass rapes to "enforced prostitution."222 The
Commission did not explicitly adopt this statement in its findings of
fact, although it did conclude that Turkey's failure to prevent such acts
on the part of its military was a violation of Article 3 of the Conven-
tion.223 The Court recognized that mass rape, a form of forced sexual
trafficking, is "inhumane and 'degrading." This case provides a basis
from which to argue that pimping, like forced prostitution by the
Turkish soldiers, is degrading treatment under Article 3, which a state is
obligated to prevent.
Another case established that discrimination against a group may
be "degrading treatment" within the meaning of Article 3. In East
African Asians v. United Kingdom, 224 the United Kingdom refused a
218. European Convention, supra note 1, art. 4, at 102.
219. European Convention, supra note 1, art. 14, at 105.
22o. App. Nos. 6780/74, 6950/75, 4 Eur. H.R. Rep. 482 (1982) (Commission report).
221. Id.
222. Cyprus v. Turkey, 4 Eur. H.R. Rep. at 493, 536-37.
223. Cyprus v. Turkey, 4 Eur. H.R. Rep. at 493, 536-37.
224. East African Asians v. United Kingdom, App. Nos. 4403170-4419170, 4422/70,
4434/70, 4443/70, 4476/70-4478/70, 4486/70, 4501/70, 4526/70-4530/70, 3 Eur.
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group of East African Asians, who were citizens of the United Kingdom
and colonies, admission to Britain. The Commission defined "degrading
treatment" as an action which lowers a person in rank, position, reputa-
tion or character, where it reaches a certain level of severity.225 The
Commission found that the United Kingdom's immigration controls
discriminated against East African Asians on the basis of their race and
concluded that this discrimination amounted to degrading treatment
under Article 3 of the Convention. 226
East African Asians arguably requires a finding that a state's failure
to prohibit and prevent trafficking is discriminatory to women as a
group, and severe enough to constitute degrading treatment. Several
arguments can be made to support the assertion that a state dis-
criminates when it fails to protect trafficked women. First, discrimina-
tion is the lack of equality, prostitution creates sex inequality, and a
state's inaction allows unequal treatment or discrimination. Second, if a
state does have laws either prohibiting trafficking of women from across
borders or of prostitution by domestic women alone, the failure to
protect the other class of prostituted women may be discrimination on
the basis of national origin. Lastly, if a country criminalizes prostitu-
tion, yet does not enforce these laws, there may be discrimination in
the enforcement of its laws.
In East African Asians, the Commission stated that "a special
importance should be attached to discrimination based on race ... and
that differential treatment of a group of persons on the basis of race
might therefore be capable of constituting degrading treatment when
differential treatment on some other ground would raise no such ques-
tion." 227 However, sex discrimination is arguably an equally significant
form of discrimination which raises similar questions as racial dis-
H.R Rep. 76 (1981) (Commission report).
225. East African Asians . United Kingdom, 3 Eur. H.R. Rep. at 77-79, 86.
226. A second important conclusion in this case is that the refusal of a right not found
in the Convention may, in certain circumstances, violate another right covered by
the Convention. As this case explains, an individual's right to enter his or her own
country is not a right protected by the Convention. However, refusal of this right
on the basis of race is discriminatory and constitutes degrading treatment under
Article 3. Thus, while Article 14 only ensures nondiscriminatory treatment with
regard to the enjoyment of the rights and freedoms set out in the Convention,
discrimination as degrading treatment has a more inclusive meaning. East African
Asians v. United Kingdom, 3 Eur. H.R. Rep. at 79. See also European Convention,
supra note 1, arts. 3, 14, at 102, 105.
227. East African Asians v. United Kingdom, 3 Eur. H.R Rep. at 86.
[Vol. 2:83
1994] LEGAL PROHIBITIONS ON TRAFFICKING IN WOMEN 121
crimination.
Although no case law discusses Article 4 in relation to prostitution,
pimping and selling women also seem to be covered by the Conven-
tion's prohibition on slavery and forced or compulsory labor. The
success of an argument under Article 4 will probably depend upon the
degree to which the prostitution appears forced. The Court or Commis-
sion, for example, would look at the violence and threats used against a
prostitute.
Article 14 of the European Convention can also be interpreted to
prohibit trafficking in women because it prohibits discrimination
against women.228 The connection between prostitution and discrimina-
tion has been clarified by feminists such as Catharine MacKinnon
229
and Kathleen Barry.230 According to these scholars, pimping or pur-
chasing women is a form of discrimination on the basis of sex.231
However, Article 14 only prohibits a state from applying the individual
rights protected by the Convention in a discriminatory manner.
232
Thus, like the precepts in the European Convention, it prohibits only
acts of member states, not of individuals. Under Article 14, a state's
failure to enact or enforce prohibitions on prostitution is arguably sex
discrimination with respect to one of the rights protected by the Europ-
ean Convention. A state's failure to protect prostituted women is ar-
guably a discriminatory application of the prohibition on forced labor
in Article 4. A similar argument can be made with respect to Article 3.
Accordingly, Article 14, standing alone, does not prohibit trafficking of
women, but used in connection with another-provision in the European
Convention, it prohibits discrimination on the basis of sex.
The legal success of the preceding arguments is uncertain. First, as
one commentator has asserted, the Commission and the Court have
abided by an "extremely narrow interpretation" of the Convention.233
Second, these enforcement bodies are unlikely to prohibit an activity
228. European Convention, supra note 1, art. 14, at 105.
229. Catharine A. MacKinnon, Prostitution and Civil Rights, 1 MICH. J. GENDER & L. 13
(1993).
23o. Barry, supra note 63.
231. MacKinnon, supra note 229; Barry, supra note 63.
232. European Convention, supra note 1, art. 14, at 105.
233. Dumas, supra note 206, at 604 (stating that this narrow interpretation has quieted
nations' fears of encroachment on their sovereignty and has thus led to greater
acceptance of the compulsory jurisdiction of the Court).
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which is tolerated, in some form, in every European state.234 As the
Italian government submitted in a case before the European Court of
Justice, "since prostitution is a widespread phenomenon tolerated in all
the Member States, it is very difficult to regard the individual, and
possibly [the] discreet and reserved, exercise of that activity as a serious
threat to public policy."2 35 If the enforcement structures reflect Europ-
ean views, they may not regard prostitution as a violation of individual
rights, but rather as an individual liberty. Until such views change,
there is only a limited possibility of protecting prostituted women in
Europe.
Despite the current limitations on the ability to enforce trafficking
prohibitions in the European human rights system, the system is in an
early stage of development and is open to change in many ways. First,
since its creation, eight protocols have been added to the Convention
and a ninth protocol is currently in the acceptance process. This Ninth
Protocol will allow an individual applicant to refer a case to the
Court.236
Second, the Court and Commission have consistently viewed the
Convention as adaptable to changing human rights norms within
Europe.237 As one commentator suggests:
Far from being bound by the intention of the drafters, the
tribunals interpret the Convention as a modern document
that responds to and progressively incorporates changing
European social and legal developments. Toward this end,
they search for the existence of rights-enhancing practices and
policies among the Contracting states that affect human
234. Holly Fechner, Focus on Amsterdam & London: Critique of the Liberal Feminist
Philosophy on Prostitution, Panel Presentation, at the Michigan Journal of Gender &
Law Symposium, Prostitution: From Academia to Activism (Oct. 30, 1992) (video-
tape on file with the Michigan Journal of Gender & Law).
235. Adoui v. Belgian State and City of Liege; Cornuaille v. Belgian State, 1982 E.C.R.
1665, 1694 (1982).
236. See Council of Europe, The Individual's Right to Seize the Court, 12 HUMAN RIGHTS
LJ. 51 (1991) (text and explanatory report of Protocol No. 9 to the European
Convention of Nov. 6, 1990). See also Torkel Opsahl, Pros and Cons of the Existing
Mechanisms for Human Rights Protection in Europe, 1 ALL-EuR. HUM. RTs. Y.B.
221, 224 (1991).
237. Laurence P, Heifer, Consensus, Coherence and the European Convention on Human
Rights, 26 CORNELL IN' L.J. 133, 134 (1993). See also Tyrer v. United Kingdom,
26 Eur. Ct. H.R (ser. A) at 15 (1978); Austria v. Italy, 1960 Y.B. Eur. Cony. on
H.R. 169-69 (Eur. Ct. of H.R.).
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rights. When these practices achieve a certain measure of
uniformity, a 'European consensus' so to speak, the Court and
Commission raise the standard of rights-protection to which
all states must adhere. 23
8
This scholar argues that the European tribunals look to developments in
international law to "confirm the existence of a movement toward a
common regional perspective ..... 239 Furthermore, he states that the
international human rights documents most widely adopted by Europ-
ean states should be given the most force, including CEDAW.240 If
CEDAW was recognized within the European human rights system, its
substantive terms effectively might be enforced within the existing
European procedural framework.
The strength of the existing procedural enforcement mechanisms,
combined with the possibility for change within the European human
rights system, is reason to watch the developing European jurisprudence
and to focus enforcement efforts in Europe. Particular goals should
include: i) an interpretation of current convention provisions to
prohibit trafficking; z) future protocols to eliminate both procedural
and substantive obstacles to individual petitions; and 3) a future
protocol which explicitly prohibits the trafficking of women. These
goals can be achieved by the efforts of the European and international
feminist community.
B. The Inter-American Human Rights System
The Inter-American human rights system holds many of the same
promises as the European system for protecting trafficked women. In
fact, certain features of the Inter-American human rights system make it
the best forum in which to work toward eliminating trafficking in
women. In i96o, the Inter-American human rights system was created
238. Heifer, supra note 237, at 134.
239. Heifer, supra note 237, at 134 n.6. Additionally, this interplay between regional and
global human rights instruments indicates that the creation of international human-
rights principles is a fluid process. Human rights norms and international customary
law develop as additional instruments in regional or global contexts and spell out
the same protections. While the state practice element of a customary international
law may only be provided when compliance with such obligations becomes con-
sistent, committing to such principles in human rights treaties can be a large factor
in showing opinio juris among in the international community. See MALcoLM N.
SiW, INTERNATiONAL LAw 79-83 (3rd ed. 1991).
240. Hefer, supra note 237, at 162.
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by the Organization of American States, when it adopted the Inter-
American Commission on Human Rights.241 The Commission was
established to promote respect for the rights set forth in the American
Declaration of Rights and Duties of Man which was entered into in
1948.242 After the American Convention became effective in 1978,243 the
Commission also took charge of enforcing this document with respect
to those states which ratified the Convention. 244 While the American
Declaration of Rights and Duties of Man remains a guiding instrument,
the widespread acceptance of the American Convention has made it the
primary human rights obligation among the American states.
245
The American Convention, while modeled on the European Con-
vention,246 contains differences which might benefit a trafficked woman
seeking to enforce her rights under it. For example, the procedures for
bringing a complaint in this system favor an individual's complaint over
a state's complaint. First, as in the European system, the, Commission
can receive individual complaints alleging violations of human rights
obligations by a state.247 In contrast to the European system, by ratify-
ing the Convention, a state obligates itself to accept the power of the
Commission to receive complaints from individuals. 248 In the Inter-
American system, as in the European Court, the Commission's right to
receive inter-state complaints is conditioned upon the acceptance of this
241. ORGANIzATION OF AmERICAN STATES, INTER-AMER cAN COMMISSION ON HumAN
RIGHTS, ANNUAL REPORT OF THE INTER-AmERicAN COMMISSION ON HuMAN
RIGHTS 1993, at 5 (1994) [hereinafter OAS COMMISSION].
242. OAS COMMISSION, supra note 241.
243. The Convention was approved by the Inter-American Specialized Conference on
Human Rights on November 22, 1969, and entered into force July 18, 1978, when
Granada deposited the eleventh instrument of ratification. OAS COMMISSION, stupra
note 241, at 6.
244. The Statute of the Commission has been amended several times in order to make
the Commission increase the scope of its enforcement power. In 1979, the General
Assembly of the OAS approved the amendments which grant the Commission
enforcement authority over the American Convention. OAS COMMISSION, supra
note 241, at 6.
245. Currently, the following nations are parties to the Convention: Argentina, Barbados,
Brazil, Bolivia, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El
Salvador, Grenada, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Jamaica, Mexico, Nicaragua,
Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Surinam, Trinidad and Tobago, Uruguay, and Venezuela.
OAS COMMISSION, supra note 241, at 6 n. 1.
246. Buergenthal, supra note 182, at 156.
247. This is true under either the Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man or the
American Convention on Human Rights.
248. American Convention, supra note 180, art. 44, 9 I.L.M. at 687.
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procedure by the state alleged to be in violation in the Inter-American
system. 249 This provision reflects the drafters' fear of one government
interfering in the internal affairs of another government.
250
Other procedural requirements of the Inter-American system are
similar to those in the European system. For example, individual peti-
tions cannot be anonymous; the complaint must be filed within a
certain time period; domestic remedies must be exhausted; the com-
plaint cannot be written in offensive language; and the subject of the
petition cannot be pending in another international settlement
procedure. 251  These requirements differ from their European
counterparts because they apply to both individual and state petitions.
Individual petitions therefore face the same barriers to admissibility as
state petitions.
After a petition is deemed admissible by the Commission, the
procedure for hearing complaints and receiving a binding decision is
similar to the European system's process. The Commission enforces the
Convention in cooperation with the Inter-American Court of Human
Rights. 252 Initially, the Commission receives and considers all com-
plaints for which it may investigate, hold hearings, and attempt to
facilitate a settlement. 253 If settlement is not reached, the Commission
prepares a report stating the facts and its conclusion.
254
At this point, the complaint may be referred by a state or by the
Commission to the Inter-American Court on Human Rights for a
binding decision.255 Individual petitioners are thus dependent on a state
or the Commission to facilitate obtaining a Court judgment. 256 The
Commission recognizes, however, the importance in helping individuals
achieve justice in the Court:
Considering that individuals do not have standing to take
their case to the Court and that a Government that has won
a proceeding in the Commission would have no incentive to
do so, in these circumstances the Commission alone is in a
249. American Convention, supra note 180, art. 45, 9 I.L.M. at 687.
250. Buergenthal, supra note 182, at 160.
251. American Convention, supra note 180, art. 46, 9 I.L.M. at 687.
252. American Convention, supra note 180, arts. 61-65, 9 IL.M. at 691-92.
253. American Convention, supra note 180, art. 48, 9 I.L.M. at 688-89.
254. American Convention, supra note 180, art. 50, 9 LL.M. at 689.
255. American Convention, supra note 180, art. 51, 9 I.L.M. at 689.
256. American Convention, supra note 180, art. 61, 9 I.L.M. at 691.
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position, by referring the case to the Court, to ensure the
effective functioning of the protective system established by
the Convention.2
57
Also, under Article 6z, a petition cannot be brought before the Court
unless a state party accepts the jurisdiction of the Court.258 The fact
that very few cases have been brought to the Court since its creation is
more a reflection on the states parties' resistance to accepting the
Court's jurisdiction than on the referral requirement.259
A decision may still be reached regardless of whether a case is or
can be referred. By a vote of an absolute majority, the Commission may
issue its opinion and conclusions concerning the question submitted.260
However, unlike a final decision by the European Committee of Mini-
sters, this decision lacks the enforceability of a court decision.261 In-
stead, the Commission may make recommendations, and if the situa-
tion is not remedied within a specified period, the Commission may
decide by a majority vote to publish its report.262 The effect of such
negative publicity may be substantial, and combined with the resulting
moral pressure from other states, may provide incentives for a state to
correct its human rights record. 263
Ultimately, the Inter-American system holds more promise for
protecting prostituted women than the European system, because the
American Convention explicitly prohibits "traffic in women." 264 Article
257. Compulsory Membership of Journalists' Association, 8 Eur. H.R. Rep. 165, 170
(1986) (Advisory Opinion of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights).
258. American Convention, supra note 180, art. 62, 9 J.L.M. at 691-92.
259. According to the 1992-1993 Annual Report of the Inter-American Commission on
Human Rights only 14 of the OAS states had accepted mandatory jurisdiction of
the Court: Argentina, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, Guatemala, Hon-
duras, Nicaragua, Panama, Peru, Surinam, Trinidad and Tobago, Uruguay, and
Venezuela. OAS COMMISSION, supra note 241, at 6 n.1.
260. American Convention, supra note 180, air. 50, 9 I.L.M. at 689.
261. American Convention, supra note 180, art. 51, 9 I.L.M. at 689.
262. American Convention, supra note 180, art. 51, 9 I.L.M. at 689.
263. The Commission represents all members of the OAS. American Convention, supra
note 180, art. 35, 9 I.L.M. at 685; see also Buergenthal, supra note 182, at 158.
264. Article 47 of the American Convention states that "[t]he Commission shall consider
inadmissible any petition ... ifi ... b. the petition or communication does not
state facts that tend to establish a violation of the rights guaranteed by this Conven-
tion." American Convention, supra note 180, art. 47, 9 I.L.M. at 688 (emphasis
added). Article 62(3) states that "[t]he jurisdiction of the Court shall comprise all
cases concerning the interpretation and application of the provisions of this Con-
vention.. . ." American Convention, supra note 180, art. 62(3), 9 I.L.M. at 692.
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6(i) states: "No one shall be subject to slavery or to involuntary
servitude, which are prohibited in all their forms, as are the slave trade
and traffic in women." 265 Further, under Articles I and 2 of the
American Convention, the states have an affirmative duty to "ensure to
all persons ... the free and full exercise of those rights and freedoms"
recognized in the American Convention.266 Although the Inter-
American Commission and Court are confined to enforcing the
provisions of the American Convention,267 this limitation is not an
obstacle to protecting prostituted women as it is in the European
system.
A problem of personal freedom could arise if the American Con-
vention is utilized to protect prostituted women. Enforcing the traffick-
ing prohibition in the American Convention will strengthen and
legitimize the entire American Convention. Enforcement of the Con-
vention, however, also legitimizes Article 4, which provides a right to
life from the moment of conception. 268 Therefore, utilizing the
American Convention to promote one right of women, such as freedom
from prostitution, may offend another right of women, such as
reproductive freedom.
The Inter-American system may ultimately be a better forum in
which to protect prostituted women than the European system for
several reasons. First, the Convention contains an unambiguous prohibi-
tion of trafficking in women. Second, certain procedural features make
the enforcement structures of the Inter-American system more accessible
to individual petitioners. However, any decision to pursue enforcement
of one provision of the American Convention should depend on one's
view of the Convention's other provisions and an analysis of the overall
balance between protections gained and rights lost.
265. American Convention, supra note 180, art. 6(1), 9 I.L.M. at 677. Advisory jurisdic-
tion of the European Court, which was established by Protocol No. 2 to the
European Convention, is very limited. It allows only the Committee of Ministers to
request such opinions, and the opinions cannot address questions of rights in the
Convention or rights which the European Court or other convention institutions
may be asked to adjudicate in a contentious proceeding. European Convention,
supra note 1, Protocol No. 2, art. 1(1)-(2), at 121.
266. Buergenthal, supra note 182, at 163.
267. American Convention, supra note 180, art. 64, 9 L.M. at 692.
268. Article 4(1) provides: "Every person has the right to have his life respected. This
right shall be protected by law and, in general, from the moment of conception. No
one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his life." American Convention, supra note 180,
art 4(1), 9 I.L.M. at 676.
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CONCLUSION
Despite many years of important work by feminists and human rights
organizations to develop and enforce international trafficking prohibi-
tions, trafficking in women remains a pervasive worldwide problem.
Legal prohibitions on trafficking in women exist in international treaties
such as the CEDAW and the 1949 Convention. For the women such as
Almira Ajanovic, the Muslim woman prostituted in a Serbian brothel,
and the fifteen-year-old Thai tribe girl bought and sold by traffickers,
the international treaties continue to prove worthless in stopping the
trafficking of women.
This essay has addressed some of the reasons why the international
treaties have failed trafficked women. Specific provisions of international
treaty law outlaw trafficking in women, but these provisions often
contain unresolved substantive issues and enforcement problems. Other
enforcement issues such as signatory nations' refusals to commit to
treaty enforcement, reservations to the treaties, and problems with the
treaties' committee structures also plague these laws. Therefore, such
enforcement issues undermine the substantive goals of the treaties and
render them practically unenforceable.
Regional treaties also contain provisions that might protect traf-
ficked women. The European Convention and the American Conven-
tion provide better opportunities for enforcing their provisions than do
U.N. Conventions. Individuals may, in some cases, assert claims under
the regional conventions in the regional human rights courts. Further,
most human rights organizations and feminist groups, at least in the
United States, overlook the regional treaties in their struggles against
international pimps. Therefore, feminist lawyers, trafficked women, and
others should increase their use of these regional treaties as a weapon in
their battles against the traffickers.
Critical attention should be focused on the deficiencies of the
international and regional treaties which purport to outlaw trafficking.
Feminist attorneys should utilize and attempt to enforce the regional
treaties as well as correct and enforce the international conventions. If
both methods are employed, the treaties may accomplish what their
framers imagined, ending a world where men can buy and sell women
in a global market for sex.
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